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No State Actor Left Behind: Rethinking
Section 1983 Liability in the Context of
Disciplinary Alternative Schools and Beyond
EMILY CHIANG†
INTRODUCTION
In 2002, as part of a growing national trend, the Atlanta
Public School system hired a private, for-profit company to
run an alternative school in Atlanta for children with
behavioral and disciplinary issues.1 The school’s main goal
was not without merit: the district wanted to rehabilitate
troublesome students by removing them from its regular
schools and providing them with a learning environment
tailored to their needs, while permitting mainstream
teachers and students to teach and learn without
distraction.2
In practice, however, the school became a warehouse for
poor African American children, providing them with
subpar educational services in a chaotic and often violent

† Associate Professor, S.J. Quinney College of Law at the University of Utah.
The author served as lead counsel in a lawsuit filed in 2008 by the American
Civil Liberties Union against a school publicly funded by the Atlanta Public
System and privately run by Community Education Partners, Inc. (“CEP”).
Many thanks to Quinney Fellows Ian Atzet, Ruth Hackford-Peer, and Adrienne
McKelvey.
1. The company the school hired, Community Education Partners, Inc., was
founded by Randle Richardson and Phil Baggett in Houston in the mid-1990s.
Annette Fuentes, Failing Students, Rising Profits, THE NATION, Sept. 19, 2005,
at 18, 20. Notably, one of CEP’s key initial investors, Tom Beasley, founded the
Corrections Corporation of America (“CCA”), id. at 20—the largest provider of
privatized prison services in the United States. Investor Relations, CORRECTIONS
CORP. OF AM., http://ir.correctionscorp.com (last visited Apr. 15, 2012).
2. Cf. infra Part I.C (describing the rationale behind alternative schools).
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environment.3 The school also violated students’
constitutional rights to due process upon being disciplined
and to be free from unreasonable searches.4 Female
students, for example, were required to “pop” their bras
each day before being granted entry to the school, pulling
their bra straps out away from their bodies and snapping
them back in, to prove that they were not concealing any
contraband in their bras.5
The
privately-run
publicly-funded
disciplinary
alternative school—in Atlanta and elsewhere—sits at the
intersection of two important phenomena in modern society:
the privatization of once core government services, such as
education; and the funneling of children (primarily poor and
of color) into the criminal justice system rather than the
educational system via a trajectory commonly referred to as
the “school-to-prison pipeline.”6 Children referred to these
schools can find it extremely difficult to return to
mainstream education; discipline and order-maintenance
techniques used at these schools often serve to prepare
students for entry into the criminal justice system by
mimicking the techniques used in correctional facilities;7
and students at these schools are routinely referred directly
to the criminal justice system for school infractions.8
3. A complaint filed by the American Civil Liberties Union on behalf of
students at the school alleged, for example, rampant violence at the school,
including instances of staff members physically assaulting students. Verified
Second Amended Complaint—Class Action at ¶ 6, M.H. v. Atlanta Indep. Sch.
Sys., No. 1:08-cv-1435-BBM (N.D. Ga. Mar. 31, 2009). The complaint also
alleged that the school barred students from taking textbooks home with them,
had a no-homework policy, did not contain a library, and did not have regular
art, music, or physical education classes. Id. ¶¶ 79, 82. 83.
4. Id. ¶¶ 7-9.
5. Id. ¶ 44.
6. For an excellent discussion of the various manifestations of the school-toprison pipeline, see generally CATHERINE Y. KIM ET AL., THE SCHOOL-TO-PRISON
PIPELINE: STRUCTURING LEGAL REFORM (2010).
7. See, e.g., Complaint at ¶¶ 1-2, A.M. v. Jackson Pub. Sch. Bd. of Trs., No.
3:11 CV 344 TSL-MTP (S.D. Miss. June 8, 2011) (alleging that students were
shackled and handcuffed to a railing for violations of minor school rules); see
also Heather Cobb, Separate and Unequal: The Disparate Impact of SchoolBased Referrals to Juvenile Court, 44 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 581, 582-88 (2009)
(discussing security procedures and police involvement in school discipline).
8. See infra Part I.B.
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Parents and reformers seeking to address conditions at
these schools can bring an action for damages under any
number of legal theories, including various state law claims
that sound in tort. Unfortunately, these actions provide only
retrospective relief, in the form of compensation for injuries
already suffered. They do not afford the same opportunity to
fix underlying problems, such as unconstitutional school
policies and practices or lack of staff training. In order to
procure forward-looking, prospective relief to change
conditions at these facilities over the long-term, would-be
litigants must seek equitable relief, i.e., declaratory or
injunctive relief. Such relief is the only way to enjoin schools
from particular practices, to order facilities to adopt
particular policies or procedures, and to declare
unconstitutional certain practices.
Would-be litigants must turn, in other words, to § 1983
of the Civil Rights Act, which provides the only civil cause of
action sounding both in equity and damages for plaintiffs
seeking redress of constitutional rights violations.9 The
problem is that relief under § 1983 may only be granted
against parties acting “under color of” state law, or state
actors,10 and publicly-funded privately-run disciplinary
alternative schools present a classic state action problem:
the government entity is likely to maintain that the private
company is the responsible party, and the private company
is likely to maintain that it is not a state actor. If
defendants prevail or plaintiffs are discouraged by the state
action doctrine, it can be nearly impossible to obtain
prospective injunctive relief.
Publicly-funded privately-run disciplinary alternative
schools exemplify the type of privatization about which we
should be most concerned: the privatization of institutions
that serve populations of people whose attendance the state
has compelled and who have constitutional rights that are
particularly vulnerable to infringement. This Article
explores the reaches of the state action doctrine through the
lens of these schools and seeks to provide a doctrinal
framework through which to view the state action that
characterizes similar institutions. Part I introduces the
phenomena of disciplinary alternative schools and the
privatization of education; Part II lays out the fundamental
9. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006).
10. Id.
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constitutional rights of students at these schools that are
particularly vulnerable to infringement; Part III explores
the applicable state action doctrine as it exists; Part IV
explains the importance of finding state action and
obtaining injunctive relief; and Part V proposes a doctrinal
test for identifying state action in the disciplinary
alternative school context and beyond.
I. PRIVATIZATION MEETS THE SCHOOL-TO-PRISON PIPELINE
A. The Privatization Phenomenon
Many have noted in recent years the increased
privatization of public services,11 and some have argued that
such privatization departs meaningfully from this country’s
long history of public-private partnerships.12 A combination
of economic factors and policy choices has resulted in the
outsourcing of services once provided exclusively by
government,13 ranging from services once considered core
government functions—like the detention and care of
prisoners—to services that, while perhaps not essential,
have nevertheless been identified with government, like the
operation of public libraries.14
11. See, e.g., Richard Frankel, Regulating Privatized Government Through §
1983, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 1449, 1451-52 (2009); Jody Freeman, Extending Public
Law Norms Through Privatization, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1285, 1289 (2003);
Myriam Gilles, Introduction to Symposium, Private Parties as Defendants in
Civil Rights Litigation, 26 CARDOZO L. REV. 1, 2 (2004); Daniel Guttman, Public
Purpose and Private Service: The Twentieth Century Culture of Contracting Out
and the Evolving Law of Diffused Sovereignty, 52 ADMIN. L. REV. 859, 863-85
(2000).
12. See, e.g., Martha Minow, Public and Private Partnerships: Accounting for
the New Religion, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1229, 1240-41 (2003) (categorizing recent
public-private initiatives as a departure from traditional public-private
partnerships).
13. Id. at 1236 (“New uses of vouchers, government contracts, and publicprivate ventures afford a chance to draw upon the strengths of different societal
sectors, to stimulate competition and innovation, and to embrace pluralism and
tolerance as important public values.”).
14. See, e.g., Sharon Dolovich, State Punishment and Private Prisons, 55
DUKE L.J. 437, 450-62 (2005) (describing the emergence of privatized prisons);
Roger A. Fairfax, Jr., Outsourcing Criminal Prosecution?: The Limits of
Criminal Justice Privatization, 2010 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 265, 275-83 (discussing
prosecution outsourcing); David Streitfeld, Outsourcing Fairly Healthy Public
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This Article uses the term “privatization” to mean the
transfer of functions culturally associated with government
to private entities, most typically and frequently via
contracts between government agencies or sub-divisions and
these private entities (which may be for-profit or nonprofit).15 Unlike some other proffered definitions,
“privatization” as used by this Article does not necessarily
involve or require market-style competition.16 Indeed, as
indicated in the discussion of privatization as applied
specifically to disciplinary alternative schools and other
similar institutions, one of the factors driving both
privatization and the abuse thereof in that context is the
lack of a sufficiently large market to drive or permit
market-style competition.17
It is also worth noting that definitions of “privatization”
that center upon the term “public function” can beg the
Libraries, Town Hears a Roar, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 27, 2010, at A1; see also Gilles,
supra note 11, at 2 (“Privatization is occurring in the administration of child
welfare services, corrections facilities, education, emergency medical services,
environmental protection, fire fighting, juvenile rehabilitation, local libraries,
parking enforcement, parks and recreations, road maintenance, transportation,
water treatment, waste and recycling services, and welfare administration.”).
15. Other definitions abound. See, e.g., Gillian E. Metzger, Privatization as
Delegation, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1367, 1370 (2003) (“[A common model of
privatization consists of] government use of private entities to implement
government programs or to provide services to others on the government’s
behalf.”). Ronald Cass has divided privatization more generally into four
categories: the divestiture of government assets, contracting out of functions,
deregulation and vouchers, and tax reductions. Ronald A. Cass, Privatization:
Politics, Law and Theory, 71 MARQ. L. REV. 449, 456-62 (1988). This Article is
interested only in the second category, and the definition it proffers of that
category is informed by Martha Minow’s definition of “privatization” as
encompassing “the range of efforts by governments to move public functions into
private hands and to use market-style competition,” Minow, supra note 12, at
1230, but seeks to offer some refinement and flexibility. It is also somewhat less
of a mouthful than the definition used by the organizers of a symposium on
privatization at the Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law: “[A] shift toward
provision by nongovernmental organizations of certain classes of goods and
services, or performance by those organizations of certain classes of functions,
for the provision or performance of which we’ve been accustomed to relying
exclusively or mainly on government offices and agencies.” Frank I. Michelman,
W(h)ither the Constitution?, 21 CARDOZO L. REV. 1063, 1063 (2000) (referring to
the definition of “privatization” provided by organizers of the symposium).
16. See, e.g., Minow, supra note 12, at 1230.
17. See infra Part IV.B.1.c.
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question in the context of the state action doctrine. 18 Much
would seem to depend on what, precisely, a public function
is—for if it is a task traditionally reserved exclusively to the
government, as defined by traditional state action
doctrine—public functions moved into private hands would
necessarily constitute state action, which would make moot
the inquiry of this Article.
For the purposes of this Article, then, the privatization
of public functions will be used to refer more broadly to
public functions as used in popular thought and writing to
understand a type of activity traditionally associated with
government. Thus, while the Supreme Court has made clear
that it does not understand the provision of education to be
a public function within the meaning of the state action
doctrine, because it is not a task traditionally reserved
exclusively to government,19 most scholars and citizens
would associate public education with government. The
same goes for libraries, the operation of the criminal justice
system, and the care provided to wards of the state—in
contrast to the performance of construction projects and
procurement of supplies for government offices.
This Article does not take sides in the normative debate
over privatization, the pros and cons of which are amply
and ably represented in the scholarship.20 Neither is it
particularly invested in or dependent upon the breadth of
the phenomenon, as its focus is on whether and what state
action doctrine should apply when disciplinary alternative
schools are in fact privatized.
18. See, e.g., Minow, supra note 12, at 1230.
19. Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 842 (1982); see also discussion infra
Part III.B.1.
20. For example, Minow notes the core positions of both sides of the debate.
Weighing in favor of privatization are improved quality and effectiveness,
competition and incentives for improvement, pluralism, and new knowledge and
infrastructure. Minow, supra note 12, at 1242-46. Weighing against it are
concerns regarding the dilution of public values, the potential mismatch
between competition and social provision, and the dangers of divisiveness and
loss of common institutions. Id. at 1246-55. For a purely pro-privatization
viewpoint taken from the private industry perspective, see generally GUILBERT
C. HENTSCHKE ET AL., REASON FOUND., EDUCATION MANAGEMENT ORGANIZATIONS:
GROWING A FOR-PROFIT EDUCATION INDUSTRY WITH CHOICE, COMPETITION, AND
INNOVATION (2002), http://www.reason.org/files/86f373eefe12bf11ff614e1305ff33
62.pdf.
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B. The School-to-Prison Pipeline
The “school-to-prison pipeline”21 is a term used by
academics, advocates, and civil rights reformers to describe
the phenomenon by which children are funneled out of the
school system and into the juvenile and criminal justice
systems.22 The funneling can take place at any number of
junctures within the education system and via any number
of policies and practices, such as zero tolerance policies that
operate to require expulsion or suspension of students
meeting certain criteria;23 referral of students to the
criminal justice system for infractions that were
traditionally handled by the schools;24 the placement of
police officers and other law enforcement officials on school
grounds;25 and increased school security measures, like the
use of metal detectors, canine units, cameras, and tasers.26
Students may also be denied an education entirely at the

21. Also referred to as “schoolhouse to the jailhouse.”
22. See, e.g., ADVANCEMENT PROJECT, EDUCATION ON LOCKDOWN: THE
SCHOOLHOUSE TO JAILHOUSE TRACK 11 (2005) [hereinafter EDUCATION ON
LOCKDOWN]; Dean Hill Rivkin, Legal Advocacy and Education Reform:
Litigating School Exclusion, 75 TENN. L. REV. 265, 268 (2008).
23. EDUCATION ON LOCKDOWN, supra note 22, at 7. Advancement Project notes
that after passage of the Gun-Free Schools Act in 1994, many states “went
above and beyond the federal mandate, passing laws that required expulsion or
suspension for the possession of all weapons, drugs and other serious violations
on or around school grounds.” Id.; see also CIVIL RIGHTS PROJECT AT HARVARD
UNIVERSITY & ADVANCEMENT PROJECT, OPPORTUNITIES SUSPENDED: THE
DEVASTATING CONSEQUENCES OF ZERO TOLERANCE AND SCHOOL DISCIPLINE
POLICIES 1 (2000) [hereinafter OPPORTUNITIES SUSPENDED] (“Zero Tolerance has
become a philosophy that has permeated our schools; it employs a brutally strict
disciplinary model that embraces harsh punishment over education.”); Eric
Blumenson & Eva S. Nilsen, One Strike and You’re Out? Constitutional
Constraints on Zero Tolerance in Public Education, 81 WASH. U. L.Q. 65, 68-75
(2003).
24. EDUCATION ON LOCKDOWN, supra note 22, at 7; KIM, supra note 6, at 3,
113; OPPORTUNITIES SUSPENDED, supra note 23, at 13 (noting the use of
mandatory referrals for aggravated assault for all fist fights in some school
districts and other referrals to law enforcement for “disturbing schools,” or
possession of a paging device).
25. EDUCATION
113.

ON

LOCKDOWN, supra note 22, at 17; KIM, supra note 6, at 3,

26. EDUCATION ON LOCKDOWN, supra note 22, at 17.
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point of enrollment,27 via non-disciplinary exclusions28 and
disciplinary “push-outs.”29
Some of these policies and practices are motivated by
safety and security concerns.30 Others may be an
unintended consequence of the No Child Left Behind Act of
2001,31 which raised the student testing stakes for schools
across the country and heightened school incentives to
remove low-performing children.32 Regardless, these policies
function together as pipelines to the juvenile and criminal
justice systems in several ways.33 First, they push students
out of the school system via expulsions and suspensions,34
often leaving students with no education alternatives or
alternatives that are inferior to regular school—which in
turn leads to a higher likelihood of juvenile incarceration. 35
Second, they refer students directly to the juvenile and
criminal justice systems, by having them arrested on the
premises of the school if need be.36 And third, they operate
to acclimatize students to the juvenile and criminal justice
systems, with diminished privacy expectations and a
culture of punishment and discipline.37
27. See KIM, supra note 6, at 26-29.
28. Id. at 30-31.
29. Rivkin, supra note 22, at 277.
30. See EDUCATION ON LOCKDOWN, supra note 22, at 15.
31. 20 U.S.C. § 6301 (2006).
32. KIM, supra note 6, at 1, 26; David N. Figlio, Testing, Crime and
Punishment, 90 J. PUB. ECON. 837, 839 (2005); Elisa Hyman, School Push-Outs:
An Urban Case Study, 38 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 684, 684 (2005).
33. A number of lawsuits have been filed challenging these practices. See,
e.g., RV v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ., 321 F. Supp. 2d 538 (E.D.N.Y. 2004)
(challenging push-out policies that either discharged students from high schools
or forced them into GED programs).
34. EDUCATION ON LOCKDOWN, supra note 22, at 11 (noting also the effects of
discouragement and high-stakes testing); Rivkin, supra note 22, at 270-71.
35. EDUCATION ON LOCKDOWN, supra note 22, at 18. Decreased attendance at
school also leads, of course, to decreased school performance, which can itself
result in a vicious cycle of disengagement from the educational system. See, e.g.,
Michael A. Clump et al., To Attend or Not to Attend: Is that a Good Question?, 30
J. INSTRUCTIONAL PSYCHOL. 220, 220, 222 (2003).
36. See EDUCATION ON LOCKDOWN, supra note 22, at 11.
37. See id. at 11-12.
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A number of researchers and advocates have noted the
disproportionate effect these policies and practices have on
the most vulnerable students in society, namely students of
color, students with disabilities, low-income students,
English language learners, and students who are homeless
or in foster care.38 The effects of the school-to-prison pipeline
on students of color and those with disabilities is
particularly pronounced.39 For example, the Advancement
Project states:
Across the board, the data shows that Black and Latino students
are more likely than their White peers to be arrested in school,
regardless of the demographics of the school’s enrollment.
Researchers conclude that racial disparities cannot be accounted
for by the socioeconomic status of students. Nor is there any
evidence that Black and Latino students misbehave more than
their White peers. Race does, however, correlate with the severity
of the punishment imposed with students of color receiving
40
harsher punishments for less severe behavior.

38. Id. at 16; KIM, supra note 6, at 1; Rivkin, supra note 22, at 270, 272. The
School-to-Prison Pipeline: Structuring Legal Reform also gathers studies
indicating that racial disparities in the imposition of school discipline have
increased over the past thirty years. KIM, supra note 6, at 2. See also Russell J.
Skiba et al., The Color of Discipline: Sources of Racial and Gender
Disproportionality in School Punishment, 34 URB. REV. 317, 318-20, 335 (2002),
where the authors collected studies providing “evidence of socio-economic and
racial disproportionality in the administration of school discipline” and provided
conclusions of their own study. The Color of Discipline also collected studies
indicating that African American students—and African American male
students in particular—are more frequently subjected to harsher disciplinary
strategies, like corporal punishment, than their white counterparts. Id. at 31920; see also OPPORTUNITIES SUSPENDED, supra note 23, at 6.
39. KIM, supra note 6, at 34-35, 51-53; see also Eric Blumenson & Eva S.
Nilsen, How to Construct an Underclass, or How the War on Drugs Became a
War on Education, 6 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 61, 77 (2002); Blumenson &
Nilsen, supra note 23, at 83-85.
40. EDUCATION ON LOCKDOWN, supra note 22, at 8; see also KIM, supra note 6,
at 2 (“[S]tudies show that African American students are more likely than their
white peers to be suspended, expelled, or arrested for the same kind of conduct
at school.”); OPPORTUNITIES SUSPENDED, supra note 23, at 7; Skiba et al., supra
note 38, at 322 (citing studies on this phenomenon). The study conducted by
Skiba and the other authors of The Color of Discipline also found that white
students were likely to be disciplined for “smoking, leaving without permission,
obscene language, and vandalism,” while black students were disciplined for
offenses like “disrespect, excessive noise, threat, and loitering.” Id. at 334
(emphasis omitted). The authors note that “[t]he majority of reasons for which
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A 2010 study reports that in some cities, over half of
African American males are suspended at least once in a
school year.41 African American and Native American
students are also more likely to be categorized as “disabled,”
and thereby segregated from mainstream educational
services.42
Not graduating from high school has been linked to
higher unemployment, lower wages, and higher risk of
involvement with the criminal justice system.43 Graduation
rates for students of color as a result of the policies
discussed are extraordinarily low. According to a 2006
report written for the Department of Labor, “[h]alf of all
black students in the country do not graduate from high
school and for boys the graduation rate is an astonishing 43
percent. Rates among Hispanics and American Indians are
also low at 48 and 47 percent, respectively.”44 Students with
disabilities did little better, with only 54% graduating with
a diploma in 2005.45 In contrast, 74.9% of white students
graduate from high school.46

white students are referred more frequently seem to be based on an objective
event . . . that leaves a permanent product. Reasons for black referrals . . . are
infractions . . . that would seem to require a good deal more subjective judgment
on the part of the referring agent.” Id.
41. KIM, supra note 6, at 2 (citing DANIEL J. LOSEN & RUSSELL J. SKIBA,
SOUTHERN POVERTY LAW CENTER, SUSPENDED EDUCATION: URBAN MIDDLE
SCHOOLS IN CRISIS (2010)).
42. Id. at 53-54.
43. See CAROLINE WOLF HARLOW, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS SPECIAL
REPORT: EDUCATION AND CORRECTIONAL POPULATIONS 1 (2003), available at
http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/ecp.pdf (“68% of State prison inmates did
not receive a high school diploma.”); see also Blumenson & Nilsen, supra note
39, at 72 & nn.57-58, 76 & n.76 (gathering data on the education level of
prisoners).
44. LAUDAN Y. ARON, THE URBAN INSTITUTE, AN OVERVIEW OF ALTERNATIVE
EDUCATION (2006), available at http://www.ncee.org/wp-content/uploads/2010/04/
OverviewAltEd.pdf; see also GARY ORFIELD ET AL., LOSING OUR FUTURE: HOW
MINORITY YOUTH ARE BEING LEFT BEHIND BY THE GRADUATION RATE CRISIS 2
(2004), available at http://www.urban.org/uploadedpdf/410936_LosingOur
Future.pdf.
45. KIM, supra note 6, at 52.
46. ORFIELD ET AL., supra note 44, at 2.
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C. Publicly-Funded, Privately-Run Disciplinary Alternative
Schools
1. Alternative Schools in General. Defined most broadly,
alternative schools encompass all education that takes place
outside of the mainstream public school system, including
charter schools, special needs schools, and schools for the
gifted and talented.47 They may represent “innovation;
small-scale, informal ambiance; and departure from
bureaucratic rules and procedures.”48 A popular typology
offered by Mary Anne Raywid breaks down alternative
schools into three categories: Type I schools are schools of
choice, they seek to innovate, may resemble magnet schools,
and are usually sought after by parents.49 Type II schools
are last chance programs that typically “focus on behavior
modification” rather than pedagogy, and include in-school
suspension programs as well as longer term placements for
the chronically disruptive.50 Type III schools are remedial in
their focus, providing academic and/or social rehabilitation
to students in the hopes of returning them to mainstream
education.51
This Article focuses upon those alternative schools that
occupy a juncture of the school-to-prison pipeline, namely
Type II schools—including those masquerading as Type III.
47. The U.S. Department of Education defines an alternative school as “[a]
public elementary/secondary school that: 1) addresses the needs of students that
typically cannot be met in a regular school; 2) provides nontraditional education;
3) serves as an adjunct to a regular school; and 4) falls outside of the categories
of regular, special education, or vocational education.” NAT ’L CTR. OF EDUC .
STATISTICS , U.S. D EP ’T OF EDUC ., NCES 2002-351, CHARACTERISTICS OF THE
100 LARGEST ELEMENTARY AND SECONDARY SCHOOL DISTRICTS IN THE U NITED
STATES : 2000-01, at 37 tbl.2 (2002).
48. Mary Anne Raywid, Alternative Schools: The State of the Art, EDUC.
LEADERSHIP, Sept. 1994, at 26.
49. Id. at 27.
50. Id.
51. Id. Raywid notes that these boundaries may be fluid, as “a compassionate
staff, for example, may give a Type II program Type III overtones. Or a
committed Type III staff may venture into programmatic innovations that mark
a Type I.” Id.; see also Augustina Reyes, The Criminalization of Student
Discipline Programs and Adolescent Behavior, 21 ST. JOHN’S J. LEGAL COMMENT.
73, 82 (2006) (“The literature defines three models of alternative education: an
innovative model; a punitive model; and a developmental model.”).
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As defined by the U.S. Department of Education, these
schools are those which
are designed to address the needs of students that typically
cannot be met in regular schools. The students who attend
alternative schools and programs are typically at risk of
educational failure (as indicated by poor grades, truancy,
disruptive behavior, pregnancy, or similar factors associated with
52
temporary or permanent withdrawal from school).

Alternative schools and programs are not inherently
bad,53 and they are certainly increasingly popular.54 In
principle, there is much to recommend the idea that
students struggling in the mainstream education system be
provided with alternatives to that system, particularly if
those alternatives involve the provision of additional
resources. In practice, however, many alternative schools
operate as “holding pens for children considered to be

52. NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., NCES 2010-026,
ALTERNATIVE SCHOOLS AND PROGRAMS FOR PUBLIC SCHOOL STUDENTS AT RISK OF
EDUCATIONAL FAILURE: 2007-08, at 1 (2010), available at http://nces.ed.gov/
pubs2010/2010026.pdf [hereinafter NCES 2010 REPORT]. Survey data from the
report reflects that students are typically referred for behavior such as physical
attacks or fights; the possession, distribution or use of alcohol or drugs;
disruptive verbal behavior; academic failure; chronic truancy; and possession or
use of a weapon. Id. at 4.
53. See David J. D’Agata, Alternative Education Programs: A Return to
“Separate but Equal?,” 29 NOVA L. REV. 635, 640-43 (2005) (summarizing
commentary by proponents and opponents of alternative education).
54. According to the National Center for Education Statistics (the primary
federal entity charged with collecting, analyzing, and reporting education
related data), 64% of public school districts in the country provided at least one
alternative school or program for at risk students, administered either by the
district or by another entity. NCES 2010 REPORT, supra note 52, at 5 tbl.1.
Another study found that by 2003, out of fifty states and the District of
Columbia, forty-eight “had some type of legislation regarding alternative schools
or programs.” CAMILLA A. LEHR ET AL., INSTITUTE ON COMMUNITY INTEGRATION,
ALTERNATIVE SCHOOLS: POLICY AND LEGISLATION ACROSS THE UNITED STATES:
RESEARCH REPORT 1, at 5 (2003), available at http://www.ici.umn.edu/
products/docs/Alternative_Schools_Report_1.pdf. For a discussion of state
policies on alternative education, see also OLEG SILCHENKO, EDUCATION
COMMISSION OF THE STATES, STATE POLICIES RELATED TO ALTERNATIVE EDUCATION
(2005), available at http://www.ecs.org/clearinghouse/65/77/6577.pdf.
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troublemakers,”55 a means by which school districts can
shunt (or funnel) students out of mainstream education.56
According to the National Center for Education
Statistics, 17% of students enrolled in an alternative school
operated by the school district dropped out of school, and 5%
were transferred to a criminal justice facility.57 The dropout
rates increased to 30% in school districts in cities.58 In
contrast, the overall national dropout rate is roughly 8%.59
Referral rates to the criminal justice system in alternative
schools also doubled in school districts in which children of
color were 50% or more of the student population.60
Although higher dropout rates and referrals to the criminal
justice system may be explained in part by the fact that
students attending alternative schools are there precisely
because they are at higher risk of dropping out or of being
referred to the criminal justice system, the very
vulnerability of this student population militates in favor of
more accountability for the entities that run such schools
and not less.
2. The Disciplinary Alternative School. Disciplinary
alternative schools, or Type II alternative schools in
55. OPPORTUNITIES SUSPENDED, supra note 23, at 12.
56. Part of the problem may be the failure of school districts to require
additional training or certification for teachers in alternative schools, which are
presumably populated by a more difficult student population with special needs.
Only 30% of school districts administering an alternative school have specific
requirements for teaching in alternative schools and programs in addition to
regular teacher requirements. NCES 2010 REPORT, supra note 52, at 4. And only
48% have professional development requirements for such teachers in addition
to those required of all teachers. Id. These percentages dip even lower when the
data is limited to city school districts or districts with greater student of color
enrollment. Id. at 18 tbl.14.
57. Id. at 4. Rates of referral to the criminal justice system may have
something to do with the fact that 80% of school districts operating an
alternative school or program collaborate with the criminal justice system to
provide services for enrolled students and 69% with the local sheriff’s
department. Id. In contrast, only 46% collaborate with job placement centers
and 55% with crisis intervention centers. Id. at 19 tbl.15.
58. Id. at 16.
59. Fast Facts—Dropout Rates, NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T
EDUC., http://nces.ed.gov/fastfacts/display.asp?id=16 (last visited Apr. 23,
2012).
OF

60. NCES 2010 REPORT, supra note 52, at 16.
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Raywid’s terminology, are one means that school districts
use to deal with a number of ailments, some perceived and
many real, such as violence in schools, unruly and/or
disruptive students,61 and students with special needs.62 As
such, they sit at a critical juncture on the school-to-prison
pipeline.63
First, they funnel a particularly vulnerable64 segment of
the student population out of mainstream public
education,65 increasing the risk that those students will drop
out of school altogether.66 Second, these schools typically
engage in more intensive disciplinary practices than regular
public schools, with more intrusive searches, harsher
discipline imposed for more minor infractions, etc.67 Some
guidelines used in these schools function both to preserve
discipline and to accustom children to the restrictions
61. See Jonathan Wren, Note, “Alternative Schools for Disruptive Youths”—A
Cure for What Ails School Districts Plagued by Violence?, 2 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y &
L. 307, 310-12 (1995) (collecting school violence data).
62. For a more sinister take on the increasing popularity of these schools, see
Reyes, supra note 51, at 73. Reyes states:
[I]t has been in the interests of builders of prisons and detention
facilities to exploit children’s proclivities for defying authority and
failing to conform to societal expectations. Simultaneously, this pattern
appeals to educators, allowing them to remove troubled youth from
school rolls, where, especially in states where financial resources and
prestige factors determine the success of schools and school personnel,
their likely-poor test performance will pull down averages.
Id. at 77-78.
63. For a sample of academic commentary critiquing these schools, see id. at
82-83, which contends that disciplinary alternative schools suffer from limited
state supervision, questionable teacher certification, a lack of student testing,
inferior curricula and teaching staff, and that the schools disrupt student
education.
64. NCES 2010 REPORT, supra note 52, at 17 (noting that 35% of alternative
schools in 2007-08 had minority enrollments of 50% or more and that 40% of
these schools had 20% or more students below the poverty level).
65. See supra Part I.B; see also Reyes, supra note 51, at 81 & n.32. The
incentives to refer poorly performing children to such schools are heightened by
the fact that states enrolling students in alternative schools for less than an
academic year are exempt from reporting requirements under the No Child Left
Behind Act for those students. KIM, supra note 6, at 100.
66. See, e.g., Reyes, supra note 51, at 78 & n.20 (collecting sources).
67. See Cobb, supra note 7, at 581.
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prisoners face in correctional facilities. Finally, these
schools tend to refer students more frequently to the
juvenile or adult criminal justice system, serving as a direct
pipeline from school to prison.68
3. The Publicly-Funded Privately-Run Alternative
School. In its 2007-08 survey on alternative education, the
Department of Education began asking school districts
about alternative education options administered by entities
other than the district—35% of districts reported using at
least one alternative school or program administered by
another entity.69 Of those districts, 26% reported that the
program was operated by a private entity under contract
with the school district (the remaining were operated by
other public entities or a two- or four-year postsecondary
institution).70
Publicly-funded privately-run disciplinary alternative
schools take place within a larger context of the increasing
use of public funds to contract with education management
organizations (“EMOs”).71 These organizations, which are
typically for-profit corporations, often operate on a
combination of school district money and venture capital to
operate charter schools.72 The phenomenon of charter
schools, which shows no signs of slowing down, is not the
focus of this Article.73 But their popularity, coupled with
their dependence upon private corporations and the fact
68. EDUCATION ON LOCKDOWN, supra note 22, at 11.
69. NCES 2010 REPORT, supra note 52, at 3.
70. Id.
71. In a report on for-profit EMOs operating public schools for the 2009-10
school year, the National Education Policy Center noted that EMOs operated in
thirty-one states and served more than 350,000 students, that the number of
these EMOs had increased to ninety-eight from fourteen in the 1997-98 school
year, and that the largest EMO managed seventy-nine schools. ALEX MOLNAR ET
AL., NAT’L EDUC. POLICY CTR., PROFILES OF FOR-PROFIT EDUCATION MANAGEMENT
ORGANIZATIONS (2010), available at http://nepc.colorado.edu/publication/EMOFP-09-10. See generally id. for a comprehensive list of EMOs and information
such as size, geographic location(s), schools operated, and student enrollment.
72. See id.
73. According to a 2010 report published by pro-privatization group, the
Reason Foundation, there are 5000 charter schools in the United States, serving
1.7 million children. LISA SNELL, REASON FOUND., ANNUAL PRIVATIZATION REPORT
2010: EDUCATION 11 (Leonard Gilroy ed., 2011).
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that some of these corporations also operate disciplinary
alternative schools, serves as a noteworthy backdrop.74
The key difference between charter schools and the
disciplinary alternative schools upon which this Article
focuses is that attendance at charter schools is not only
voluntary, but typically highly desired. 75 Parents with
children enrolled in charter schools are always free to
return them to regular public school, whereas attendance at
a disciplinary alternative school is nearly always
involuntary, as students are frequently referred either by
the school district, their local public school, or the juvenile
justice system.76 The alternative to a court or school district
referred disciplinary alternative education is typically
either private school (which is no alternative at all for
parents without the financial means) or no school at all.
Although there is much that distinguishes these schools
from privately run prisons, some key aspects of both types
of institutions are notably similar: both serve vulnerable
populations whose presence at the institution is
involuntary, both revolve around a disciplinary component,
and both contain built-in incentives to economize.77 As one
74. Per the National Education Policy Center, “charter schools account for
93.4% of all EMO-managed schools.” MOLNAR ET AL., supra note 71, at 7. Much
has been written about the advisability, success or failure, and public policy
implications of charter schools. See, e.g., F. Howard Nelson & Nancy Van Meter,
What Does Private Management Offer Public Education?, 11 STAN. L. & POL’Y
REV. 271, 272 (2000) (arguing against the advisability of charter schools on
grounds of poor performance).
75. That said, see Robert J. Martin, Charting the Court Challenges to Charter
Schools, 109 PENN ST. L. REV. 43 (2004), for a general overview of litigation over
charter schools.
76. Cf. Vanessa Ann Countryman, School Choice Programs Do Not Render
Participant Private Schools “State Actors,” 2004 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 525, 544
(arguing private schools participating in school choice programs should not be
considered state actors in large part because attendance at such schools is
voluntary).
77. The line between residential juvenile detention facilities and disciplinary
alternative schools is not a particularly clear one, as the vast majority of such
facilities offer some type of education services. See NAT’L EVALUATION &
TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE CTR., 2010 JUVENILE JUSTICE FACILITIES FACT SHEET 2
(2010), available at http://www.neglected-delinquent.org/nd/docs/factsheet
_facilities.pdf. There are a striking number of such facilities across the country,
a significant percentage of which are privately operated. See SARAH
HOCKENBERRY ET AL., OFFICE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE & DELINQUENCY PREVENTION,
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commentator explains in the private prison context,
contractors are often tempted to save money (and thereby
increase profit) by reducing the amount spent on inmate
needs and by cutting the cost of labor.78
Just as privately-run prisons may try to save money on
inmate medical care and access to rehabilitative
programming,79 privately run disciplinary alternative
schools are incentivized to save money on student services
such as counseling, rehabilitation, and support services for
those with special needs. Labor cost-cutting in such schools
may come in the form of non-unionized teachers and other
staff, teachers and staff with fewer certifications or
educational attainments than at mainstream schools, and
reductions in training for teachers and staff. All of these
cost savings arguably impact the quality of education
received by students at disciplinary alternative schools even
more than they would students at mainstream schools;
students at disciplinary alternative schools are, after all,
placed in such schools precisely because they have needs
greater to or different from students at mainstream schools.
II. STUDENT CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS VULNERABLE TO
INFRINGEMENT AT DISCIPLINARY ALTERNATIVE SCHOOLS
Much like other institutions serving vulnerable
populations, disciplinary alternative schools are a setting
particularly ripe for abuses of constitutional rights: the
student body is relatively powerless,80 students often have a
history of disciplinary or behavioral issues, and the hiring of
staff is usually not as regulated as for mainstream public
schools.81 This Part briefly enumerates the types of rights
JUVENILE RESIDENTIAL FACILITY CENSUS, 2008: SELECTED FINDINGS 2 (2011),
available at https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/ojjdp/231683.pdf (data collected from
2860 juvenile facilities).
78. Dolovich, supra note 14, at 474-75.
79. Id. at 474.
80. See supra Part I.B.
81. Reyes, supra note 51, at 108 (“[Disciplinary alternative] schools operate
virtually free of state supervision with regard to education impact, teacher
performance, or other system controls.”). For a discussion of how the profit
motive in cases involving disciplinary alternative schools run by private, forprofit entities may further affect student rights, see infra Part IV.B.1.b.
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violations one would expect to find at disciplinary
alternative schools, as evidenced by the types of claims filed
on behalf of students at such schools and as predicted by the
educational environment.82 It is worth noting that however
watered-down student constitutional rights may seem when
compared to their adult counterparts, the allegations raised
against many educational facilities in this context would
easily surmount the bars set by courts. And, of course, for
the purposes of this Article’s state action inquiry, the
existence of a rights violation is assumed, with the key
question being only who may be held liable.
The purpose of this Part is not to chronicle the
particular legal claims that may be filed by students subject
to each of the below rights violations or to delve into the
wealth of lower court cases on student rights,83 but rather to
indicate the breadth and depth of the rights applicable to
students—and thereby to highlight their vulnerability to
deprivations committed by private parties not subject to
constitutional limitation.84 In each instance, the concern is
that a school employee under contract with the private
company, not the state, violates student rights. Under
traditional state action analysis, it is unclear whether such
actions are susceptible to constitutional limits or whether
the sole recourse for injured students is an action in tort or
other common law.
As discussed further in Part IV.C, such common law
claims may succeed in procuring damages relief for injuries
such as a one-off unconstitutional search, but they are
largely incapable of addressing the types of systemic
failures that result in repeated and ongoing constitutional
violations. For example, inappropriate school search policies
and guidelines coupled with a lack of training for school
staff in proper search techniques can result in a pattern and
practice of illegal searches. Damages recovery for any one
82. See infra Part III.C for a discussion of lower court cases involving
allegations against privately-run educational facilities and a flavor of the types
of claims that are typically brought.
83. For that, see generally KIM, supra note 6, at 78-96, which discusses legal
claims relevant to challenging suspensions and expulsions.
84. This Part focuses, moreover, only on that law which is relatively clear as
stated by the Supreme Court. It does not delve into lower court cases or,
perhaps more significantly for would-be plaintiffs and advocates for reform,
state constitutional protections.
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particular student subject to these practices provides relief
only for that particular student, means that other students
seeking relief must wait until they have been injured to file
similar claims, and does not necessarily alleviate the risk
that future students face of further such searches.
A. First Amendment: Speech and Establishment Clauses
Although the Supreme Court’s (in)famous proclamation
in 1969, in Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community
School District,85 that “[i]t can hardly be argued that either
students or teachers shed their constitutional rights to
freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate”86
has been much watered down in recent years, students do
still have First Amendment rights—and these rights are
particularly subject to infringement in a disciplinary
alternative school environment.87
Students continue to have the right to express core
political opinions and other beliefs that may be unpopular,88
as long as such speech does not “materially and
substantially interfere with the requirements of appropriate
discipline in the operation of the school.”89 School officials
interested in order maintenance and discipline may be
especially inclined to impose viewpoint or content based
restrictions on student speech,90 regardless of whether there
85. 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
86. Id. at 506.
87. See, e.g., Amended Complaint ¶ 107, D.L. v. Youth Servs. Int’l Inc., 2011
WL 1303167 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 31, 2011) (No. 0:10-cv-61902-KMM) [hereinafter
Amended Complaint, D.L.] (“Defendants[’] . . . practice of intimidating,
threatening, harassing, and punishing youth for exercising their right to speak
to attorneys and access the courts violates Plaintiffs’ First Amendment right to
free speech . . . .”); Amended Complaint ¶ 156, Brian B. v. Stalder, 2005 WL
1847000 (M.D. La. Aug. 2, 2005) (No. 3:98-cv-00886-JJB-SCR) [hereinafter
Amended Complaint, Brian B.] (alleging freedom of speech and association
violation).
88. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 509 (“In order for . . . school officials to justify
prohibition of a particular expression of opinion, it must be able to show that its
action was caused by something more than a mere desire to avoid the discomfort
and unpleasantness that always accompany an unpopular viewpoint.”).
89. Id. (quoting Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d 744, 748 (5th Cir. 1966)).
90. Some lower courts have upheld school suspensions where officials can
“demonstrate[ ] a concrete threat of substantial disruption” that is linked to a
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is a showing of material and substantial interference,
whether the speech might reasonably be perceived as being
the official speech of the school,91 promotes illegal drug use,92
or is sexual, vulgar, or offensive.93
Students at disciplinary alternative schools may also be
particularly
susceptible
to
infringement
of
the
Establishment Clause and of their Free Exercise rights. It is
well-settled that if after-school clubs are generally
permitted, religious clubs must be permitted as well;94 that
school officials may not use public schools to proselytize,
and that formal school prayers are unconstitutional.95 The
root of the Court’s concern for the vulnerability of students
history of past events. Sypniewski v. Warren Hills Reg’l Bd. of Educ., 307 F.3d
243, 247, 262 (3d Cir. 2002) (upholding suspension of a student wearing a t-shirt
with Confederate flag and “redneck” written on it in light of history of racial
hostilities at school). However, the mere fact that many students attending
disciplinary alternative schools may have a history of disciplinary infractions
does not mean that school officials may impose limits on their speech without
any demonstration that such limits are necessary to prevent actual disruption.
See Tinker, 393 U.S. at 513.
91. Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 271-72 (1988)
(permitting limits on speech that may reasonably be perceived as being official
school speech in context of school newspaper).
92. Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 403 (2007) (permitting limits on
student speech that may be interpreted as promoting illegal drug use).
93. Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 683 (1986) (permitting
limits on speech of a sexual or vulgar nature).
94. See, e.g., Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 102 (2001);
Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 845-46
(1995). Whether strict dress codes that conflict with student religious beliefs and
practices may violate student Free Exercise rights remains to be seen. See, e.g.,
A.A. ex rel. Betenbaugh v. Needville Indep. Sch. Dist., 611 F.3d 248, 253 (5th
Cir. 2010) (finding dress code prohibiting long hair violated Texas Religious
Freedom Act right of student whose religious beliefs prohibited hair cutting);
Jacobs v. Clark Cnty. Sch. Dist., 526 F.3d 419, 439-40 (9th Cir. 2008) (finding
dress code did not infringe on student’s Free Exercise rights because it applied
to students equally regardless of their religious beliefs, and prohibited conduct,
not free exercise).
95. Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 294, 317 (2000) (holding
that school policy permitting student-led prayers before high school football
games violated Establishment Clause); Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 592-93
(1992) (noting that the Constitution is violated when schools “employ the
machinery of the State to enforce a religious orthodoxy” and finding
unconstitutional clergy-led prayer at public school graduation).
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in the context of the Establishment Clause may be further
amplified in the context of a disciplinary alternative school,
in which coercive pressures are arguably even stronger than
in regular public schools given the inherent emphasis on
discipline and obeying authority.96
If a state entity contracts with an overtly religious
company to operate a publicly-funded overtly religious
school, the action of entering the contract is undoubtedly
state action and thus subject to constitutional limit.
However, the paradigmatic cause for concern would be the
state contract with a secular company that happens to hire
a proselytizing employee who provides religiously based
instruction or requires prayer in the classroom, or where
the company is secular in theory but religious in practice.97
Whether that employee’s actions are constrained by the
Constitution is the question this Article seeks to address.
Finally, it is also worth noting that the Court’s
repeatedly expressed deference to local school boards in its
post-Tinker opinions may not be as salient where the
school’s decision-making authority rests with an operating
entity that is arguably not politically accountable at all, but
rather a private, for-profit corporation.98
B. Fourth Amendment: Searches by School Officials
According to the National Center for Education
Statistics, 61% of public high schools use random dog sniffs
to look for drugs, and almost one-third use at least one
other type of random search to detect contraband.99 The
96. See Lee, 505 U.S. at 593 (noting that public pressure and peer pressure,
“though subtle and indirect, can be as real as any overt compulsion”).
97. For example, the founder of Youth Services International Inc., a largescale provider of education and behavioral modification programs for troubled
youth, has spoken about the impact of his religious faith on his trajectory from
orphanages to CEO of the company. John Dorfman, King of Reform Schools Eyes
Orphanages, WALL ST. J., Feb. 1, 1995, at B1.
98. See, e.g., Fraser, 478 U.S. at 683 (“The determination of what manner of
speech in the classroom or in school assembly is inappropriate properly rests
with the school board.”); cf. Poling v. Murphy, 872 F.2d 757, 761 (6th Cir. 1989)
(noting that decisions regarding student speech are “best left to the locally
elected school board, not to a distant life-tenured judiciary”).
99. RACHEL DINKES ET AL., NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, INDICATORS
SCHOOL CRIME AND SAFETY: 2007, at 113-14 (2007).
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Supreme Court held in New Jersey v. T.L.O. that students
have a legitimate interest in privacy, although school
officials need only reasonable suspicion (rather than
probable cause) to conduct a search.100 The Court has noted
that “the search as actually conducted [must be] reasonably
related in scope to the circumstances which justified the
interference in the first place,” and that the scope of the
search may not be “excessively intrusive in light of the age
and sex of the student and the nature of the infraction.”101
The Court has further acknowledged the difference
inherent in searching adults compared to students, whose
“adolescent
vulnerability
intensifies
the
patent
intrusiveness of the exposure,” and determined that the
reasonableness of a student’s expectation of privacy “is
indicated by the consistent experiences of other young
people similarly searched.”102 Thus, a strip search conducted
in an effort to find ibuprofen pills without any indication
that the pills were actually hidden in a student’s
underwear, is unconstitutional.103
Although the Court has found permissible mandatory
drug testing (without any individualized suspicion) for
student athletes, it has emphasized that student athletes
participate in extracurricular sports voluntarily,104 and that
schools should not assume
that suspicionless drug testing will readily pass constitutional
muster in other contexts. The most significant element in this
case is the first we discussed: that the Policy was undertaken in
furtherance of the government’s responsibilities, under a public
school system, as guardian and tutor of children entrusted to its
105
care.

100. 469 U.S. 325, 337, 341-42 (1985) (“[A] search . . . will be ‘justified at its
inception’ when there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that the search will
turn up evidence that the student has violated or is violating either the law or
the rules of the school.”).
101. Id. at 341-42.
102. Safford Unified Sch. Dist. # 1 v. Redding, 129 S. Ct. 2633, 2641 (2009).
103. Id. at 2642 (“Here, the content of the suspicion failed to match the degree
of the intrusion.”).
104. Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 657 (1995).
105. Id. at 665. The Court has subsequently permitted mandatory drug testing
of all students participating in extracurricular activities, but specifically noted
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As evidenced by the complaints filed by parents of
students at disciplinary alternative schools, the urge to
search students at such schools in the absence of
individualized
suspicion
(or
participation
in
an
extracurricular activity) can be almost overwhelming. In the
Community Education Partners case, for example, students
alleged that they were subjected to routine invasive
searches each day prior to entering the school, and that
those searches included not only the use of metal detectors,
but also required that they remove their belts and shoes,
submit to pat downs, and open their mouths for searching.106
If conducted by a police officer on school grounds, an
unreasonable search is clearly state action. Whether the
Constitution applies when the search is conducted by a
school resource officer is somewhat less clear,107 and the
state action problem is compounded if employees hired by
the private company under contract with the state then subcontract school safety matters to another private company.
C. Fifth and Sixth Amendments: Questioning by School
Officials and Access to Counsel
One aspect of the school-to-prison pipeline that
frequently manifests itself in the context of disciplinary
alternative schools is the referral of students to the juvenile
or adult criminal justice system for infractions that take
place on school grounds.108 Such referrals are often made
without appropriate Fifth and Sixth Amendment
protections,109 which the Court first found applicable to
juveniles in In re Gault.110
that under the testing scheme it upheld “the test results are not turned over to
any law enforcement authority. Nor do the test results . . . lead to the imposition
of discipline or have any academic consequences.” Bd. of Educ. of Indep. Sch.
Dist. No. 92 of Pottawatomie Cnty. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 833 (2002).
106. Verified Second Amended Complaint, supra note 3, ¶¶ 40-49; see also
Amended Complaint, Brian B., supra note 87, ¶ 85 (alleging strip searches of
students with “little or no justification”).
107. KIM, supra note 6, at 120-22.
108. See supra Part I.B.
109. See, e.g., Amended Complaint, D.L., supra note 87, ¶ 67 (alleging
deprivation of right to contact attorneys and to maintain confidential
communications with counsel); Complaint at ¶¶ 4-9, Antoine ex rel Milk v.
Winner Sch. Dist. 59-2, 2006 WL 3007375 (D.S.D. Oct. 20, 2006) (No. Civ. 06-
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The Fifth Amendment protection against selfincrimination applies to students questioned if they face
potential criminal liability or a juvenile delinquency
petition111: “It would indeed be surprising if the privilege
against self-incrimination were available to hardened
criminals but not to children.”112 The Sixth Amendment
additionally requires that timely notice be provided to
juveniles and their parents of the specific charges and
allegations, and that they be informed of the child’s right to
counsel.113
When questioning may have juvenile law consequences,
the Court has also cautioned that extra care must be taken
“to assure that [an] admission was voluntary, in the sense
not only that it has not been coerced or suggested, but also
that it was not the product of ignorance of rights or of
adolescent fantasy, fright or despair.”114 Similarly, any
waiver of a juvenile’s rights must take into account the
totality of the circumstances, which include the juvenile’s
age, education, experiences, intelligence, background, and

3007) (alleging school administrators coerced student confessions, which were
then handed over to the police department for use in prosecution); Amended
Complaint, Brian B., supra note 87, ¶¶ 140-41 (alleging improper restriction of
access to the courts by failing to provide youth with access to a law library or
assistance from a person trained in the law, and violation of right to confidential
communications with counsel).
110. 387 U.S. 1, 55 (1967).
111. See Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 444 (1972) (“[T]he Fifth
Amendment privilege against compulsory self-incrimination . . . can be asserted
in any proceeding, civil or criminal, administrative or judicial, investigatory or
adjudicatory . . . .”); see also Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 486-87
(1951) (“To sustain the privilege, it need only be evident from the implications of
the question, in the setting in which it is asked, that a responsive answer to the
question or an explanation of why it cannot be answered might be dangerous
because injurious disclosure could result.”). The privilege would not, however,
apply to questioning solely for school disciplinary purposes, although the
Fourteenth Amendment’s due process protections may. See infra Part II.D.
112. In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 47; see also id. at 44 (“[C]lear and unequivocal
evidence that [a self-incriminating] admission was made with knowledge that
[the juvenile] was not obliged to speak and would not be penalized for remaining
silent [is required for its admissibility].”).
113. Id. at 33-36.
114. Id. at 55.
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whether he understands the warnings and consequences of
waiving his rights.115
All of the concerns expressed by the Court are
particularly salient when a student is being questioned by
school officials, under which circumstances students may
feel even less free to leave than adults being questioned by
law enforcement officials, and when they may not
understand that the questioning may have consequences
outside of the school.116
D. Fourteenth Amendment: Procedural and Substantive
Due Process117
Given the emphasis on discipline at many alternative
schools, one nearly inevitable rights concern is that of
procedural due process prior to the imposition of
discipline.118 The Supreme Court has made clear in Goss v.
115. Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 724-25 (1979).
116. Cf. Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1486 (2010) (holding that
criminal defense attorneys must advise non-citizen clients of the immigration
consequences that guilty pleas may have).
117. This Article does not discuss the procedural due process rights of students
not to be referred to a disciplinary alternative school in the first place as there is
no state action issue; the transferring entity is inevitably the state itself. See,
e.g., Langley v. Monroe Cnty. Sch. Dist., 264 F. App’x 366, 368 (5th Cir. 2008).
Such challenges have had little success in the lower courts and typically must
hinge on a claim that the education being provided by the alternative school is
so inferior as to constitute a wholesale deprivation of the state right to a public
education. See, e.g., Nevares v. San Marcos Consol. Indep. Sch. Dist., 111 F.3d
25, 27 (5th Cir. 1997); Order at 30-31, M.H. v. Atlanta Indep. Sch. Sys., No.
1:08-cv-1435-BBM (N.D. Ga. Mar. 31, 2009).
118. See, e.g., Complaint, supra note 7, ¶¶ 32-33, 100 (alleging the use of
handcuffs to punish students for non-criminal violations of school rules without
a hearing or other opportunity to be heard); Complaint for Injunctive and
Declaratory Relief ¶¶ 29-30, D.W. v. Harrison Cnty., No. 1:09-cv-267-LG-RHN
(S.D. Miss. Apr. 20, 2009) [hereinafter Complaint for Injunctive and Declaratory
Relief, D.W.] (alleging arbitrary and excessive discipline by placing students in
“lockdown” from three days to an entire week without any due process
protections); Complaint ¶¶ 106-07, A.A. v. Wackenhut Corr. Corp., No. 00-246C-MI (M.D. La. Apr. 3, 2000) [hereinafter Complaint, A.A.] (“Defendants
knowingly permit staff to engage in a series of abusive and demeaning
disciplinary practices [without due process, including] forcing youth to wiggle
across cold concrete on their bellies; . . . to squat naked with their buttocks apart
for long periods of time during the conduct of searches; removing clothing and
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Lopez that students are entitled to some level of due process
prior to being disciplined, and that the process required
escalates along with the discipline imposed.119
Thus, for short-term suspensions of ten days or less, a
student must “be given oral or written notice of the charges
against him and, if he denies them, an explanation of the
evidence the authorities have and an opportunity to present
his side of the story.”120 The Court further noted that
“[l]onger suspensions [for more than ten days] or expulsions
for the remainder of the school term, or permanently, may
require more formal procedures. Nor do we put aside the
possibility that in unusual situations, although involving
only a short suspension, something more than the
rudimentary procedures will be required.”121
Discipline is not always limited to the imposition of
time-outs, suspensions, and expulsions, but may also
include corporal punishment. The Court has held in the
context of “paddling” that although “Fourteenth
Amendment liberty interests are implicated,” the practice of
paddling is well within the common law tradition and that
common law remedies are adequate to afford due process. 122
However, the Court noted that it did not reach the question
of “whether or under what circumstances corporal
mattresses as punishment; and, placing painful arm bars on youth in order to
make them stand in the corner.”).
119. 419 U.S. 565, 574 (1975) (“[A] student’s legitimate entitlement to a public
education [i]s a property interest which is protected by the Due Process Clause
and which may not be taken away for misconduct without adherence to the
minimum procedures required by that Clause.”); see also Mathews v. Eldridge,
424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976) (“[Courts must consider] the private interest that will
be affected by the official action; . . . the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such
interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of
additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and . . . the Government’s
interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative
burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would
entail.”).
120. Goss, 419 U.S. at 581.
121. Id. at 584; see also Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 323 n.15 (1975)
(“That is not to say that the requirements of procedural due process do not
attach to expulsions. Over the past 13 years the Courts of Appeals have without
exception held that procedural due process requirements must be satisfied if a
student is to be expelled.”).
122. Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 674, 682 (1977).
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punishment of a public school child may give rise to an
independent federal cause of action to vindicate substantive
rights under the Due Process Clause.”123 The analysis is
likely different for corporal punishment not “authorized and
limited by the common law,”124 such as that complained of at
a number of disciplinary alternative schools.125
Should discipline escalate to the level of referral to local
law enforcement, additional, more stringent, due process
protections apply.126 And if the punishment imposed is for
an infraction so poorly defined that students do not have
notice of the conduct prohibited and/or that it encourages
arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement, it may be void for
vagueness.127
Finally, although the Court has left open the question of
whether the Fourteenth Amendment or the Eighth
Amendment applies to complaints about conditions of
confinement for juveniles,128 the complaints about such
123. Id. at 679 n.47.
124. See id. at 682; see also, e.g., Mahone v. Ben Hill Cnty. Sch. Sys., 377 F.
App’x 913, 914, 917 (11th Cir. 2010) (finding that a gym teacher who roughhoused with a special education student did not violate the Fourteenth
Amendment); Ellis ex rel. Pendergrass v. Cleveland Mun. Sch. Dist., 455 F.3d
690, 695, 700 (6th Cir. 2006) (finding that a teacher who punished a student by
slamming her head against the blackboard, throwing her to the ground and
choking her violated the Fourteenth Amendment); Milonas v. Williams, 691
F.2d 931, 941-43 (10th Cir. 1982) (use of an isolation chamber and excessive
force violated the Fourteenth Amendment).
125. Plaintiffs in the case against the Atlanta Independent School District, for
example, alleged routine physical violence against students, committed both by
other students and faculty and staff members. Verified Second Amended
Complaint, supra note 3, ¶¶ 57-59 (“Teachers (and at least one administrator)
routinely hit students, throw books at them, and throw students against walls
or to the floor. . . . [S]chool resource officers and police officers, who are often
physically aggressive, . . . have a practice of using chokeholds on the students.”).
126. See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 33, 56 (1967). The Court notes that “due
process of law requires notice . . . which would be deemed constitutionally
adequate in a civil or criminal proceeding” and “confrontation and sworn
testimony by witnesses available for cross-examination” where appropriate. Id.
127. See Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 679 (1986).
128. With the exception of the Seventh Circuit, the circuit courts have
analyzed these claims under the Fourteenth Amendment. Compare Nelson v.
Heyne, 491 F.2d 352, 354-56 (7th Cir. 1974) (analyzing school disciplinary
measures under the Eighth Amendment), with Ellis ex rel. Pendergrass, 455
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conditions evidence actionable claims under one or the
other.129
III. CURRENT STATE ACTION DOCTRINE
A. An Overview of the State Action Requirement
Setting aside criticism of the requirement for state
action at all,130 the state action doctrine at its most essential
F.3d at 700 (Sixth Circuit citing the Fourteenth Amendment), and Milonas, 691
F.2d at 939 (Tenth Circuit citing the Fourteenth Amendment).
129. See e.g., Complaint for Injunctive and Declaratory Relief ¶¶ 1, 17, 20-32,
J.H. ex rel. Gray v. Hinds Cnty., 2011 WL 3047667 (S.D. Miss. July 25, 2011)
(No. 3:11-cv-327-DPJ-FKB) (alleging facility subjected children to “sensory
deprivation,” “inadequate mental health care,” and “verbal abuse”); Amended
Complaint, D.L., supra note 87, ¶¶ 3, 65 (alleging brutal and excessive physical
force on a regular basis to intimidate and terrorize youth); Complaint for
Injunctive and Declaratory Relief, D.W., supra note 118, ¶ 1 (“The abusive
conditions at the Juvenile Detention Center include punitive shackling, staff-onyouth assaults, 22-24 hour a day lock-down in filthy jail cells, unsanitary
conditions resulting in widespread contraction of scabies and staph infections,
dangerous overcrowding . . . , and inadequate mental health care.”); Amended
Complaint, Brian B., supra note 87, ¶¶ 1, 83, 84 (alleging use of excessive force
and unreasonable restraints on Plaintiffs, failure to protect Plaintiffs from
sexual abuse by staff, requiring students to “place their foreheads on a desk and
remain in that position for hours at a time,” and forcing students to “stand en
masse outside in the hot sun”); Complaint, A.A., supra note 118, ¶¶ 83-95, 98107 (alleging excessive force, unreasonable use of bodily restraints, excessive
and harmful use of chemical gas, failure to protect from harm, and abusive and
arbitrary disciplinary practices).
130. See, e.g., Charles L. Black, Jr., Foreword: “State Action,” Equal Protection,
and California’s Proposition 14, 81 HARV. L. REV. 69, 90 (1967) (“The ‘state
action’ concept in the field to which I have limited myself has just one practical
function; if and where it works, it immunizes racist practices from constitutional
control.”); Erwin Chemerinsky, Rethinking State Action, 80 NW. U. L. REV. 503,
505-06 (1985) (“It is time to again ask why infringements of the most basic
values—speech, privacy, and equality—should be tolerated just because the
violator is a private entity rather than the government. . . . I contend that by
any theory of rights . . . the state action requirement makes no sense.”). Frank
Michelman presents a variation on the critique, suggesting that “[t]he
prevailingly formalistic American state action doctrine . . . is, in significant
degree, ideologically motivated”—and that the doctrine is therefore “potentially
radically unstable under pressure of such novel developments in civil society as
massive privatization.” Michelman, supra note 15, at 1080-81. For an analysis of
this issue in the education context specifically, see Mark Tushnet, Public and
Private Education: Is There a Constitutional Difference?, 1991 U. CHI. LEGAL F.
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holds that the Constitution constrains only government
behavior, not private behavior.131 Thus, parents are not
subject to the First Amendment when disciplining their
children for speaking out of line, or to the Fourth
Amendment when searching their bedrooms. The
Fourteenth Amendment (which prohibits states from
violating federal constitutional rights) applies only to state
government entities: “No State shall make or enforce any
law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of
citizens of the United States.”132
In the context of § 1983 litigation, the state action
requirement is similarly made clear by the text of the
statute itself:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance,
regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory . . . ,
subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United
States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the
deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an
action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for
133
redress . . . .

The Supreme Court has noted that § 1983’s “under
color” of law requirement is the same as the Fourteenth
Amendment’s state action requirement.134
In practice, the state action doctrine is largely known
for (and taught in law schools via) its various exceptions.
Here, again, criticism abounds for the doctrine’s lack of
clarity,135 but at its most essential, the doctrine provides
43, 73 (“[C]onstitutional doctrine . . . does not support a strong distinction
between public and private schools.”).
131. Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 11 (1883).
132. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV (emphasis added); see also Shelley v. Kraemer,
334 U.S. 1, 13 (1948).
133. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006) (emphasis added). This Article does not address
the various doctrinal difficulties of prevailing in a § 1983 suit once the first
hurdle—that of demonstrating state action—has been passed. It is worth noting,
however, that many aspects of § 1983 doctrine overlap with state action
doctrine. See infra Part V.A.2.
134. Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 929 (1982).
135. See, e.g., Black, supra note 130, at 91 (“The literature of ‘state action’ is
the literature of a non-concept.”); Chemerinsky, supra note 130, at 503-04
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that seemingly private entities may be held liable as state
actors when they play a government role, when the action
was compelled by the state, when they are engaged in joint
action with the government, or when they are otherwise
entwined with the government. The inquiry is a highly factintensive one, but the overarching question is whether the
action is “fairly attributable to the State.”136
The first two of the traditional tests to determine state
action are relatively straightforward, as they are designed
to address those circumstances in which the private actor is
functionally the state itself, or in which the private actor
has been commanded by the state to take the complained-of
action. First, the “public function” test attempts to
determine whether the private actor has been delegated a
public function by the state.137 The continued viability of the
public function test in an era of increased privatization is
unclear. As government entities privatize functions once
considered “public,” courts puzzling out the presence of
state action under this test confront a catch-22: if the
function was public, it would not have been subject to
privatization in the first place, and yet it has, which is why

(“There still are no clear principles for determining whether state action
exists.”). Others have focused on ways to refine or reconceptualize the doctrine
itself to make it more coherent. See, e.g., Sheila S. Kennedy, When Is Private
Public? State Action in the Era of Privatization and Public-Private Partnerships,
11 GEO. MASON U. C.R. L.J. 203, 219 (2001) (proposing an understanding of state
action using conventional agency law analysis). Some contend that the doctrine
is “frankly normative,” in that it is merely “the label for the conclusion reached
after a decision not to decide in a certain category of cases.” Frederick Schauer,
Acts, Omissions, and Constitutionalism, 105 ETHICS 916, 922-24 (1995); Michael
L. Wells, Identifying State Actors in Constitutional Litigation: Reviving the Role
of Substantive Context, 26 CARDOZO L. REV. 99, 111 (2004).
136. Lugar, 457 U.S. at 937; see also Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch.
Athletic Ass’n, 531 U.S. 288, 295-96 (2001) (“What is fairly attributable is a
matter of normative judgment, and the criteria lack rigid simplicity. . . . [N]o
one fact can function as a necessary condition across the board for finding state
action; nor is any set of circumstances absolutely sufficient, for there may be
some countervailing reason against attributing activity to the government.”).
137. See, e.g., Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461, 468-69 (1953) (finding a private
political association that excluded African American candidates was a state
actor because they held pre-primary elections); Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501,
507-09 (1946) (holding that a company-owned town was a state actor because it
functioned like any other non privately-owned town).
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there is a legal action before the court. 138 The second test, of
state compulsion, attempts to determine whether the action
at issue was the result of the state’s exercise of coercive
power or significant encouragement, or whether the private
entity engaged in the action is otherwise controlled by the
state.139
Application of the next two tests is a little more opaque.
They seek to determine whether the state was somehow
sufficiently involved with the private actor and/or
complained-of action such that state action exists. The
nexus, or joint action, test attempts to determine whether
the private actor has operated as a willful participant in
joint activity with the state. The idea is that if the state and
private actor have embarked on a mutual venture or have
colluded with one another, state action is present.140 Cases
decided upon this ground have declined markedly since the
passage of the 1963 Civil Rights Act and it is unclear the
extent to which the doctrine has continued viability.141 In
fact, much of the joint action inquiry now appears to turn
upon the extent to which the state qua state has actively
intervened or acted, blurring the distinction between this
inquiry and that for state compulsion.142
138. See Alfred C. Aman, Jr., An Administrative Law Perspective on
Government Social Service Contracts: Outsourcing Prison Health Care in New
York City, 14 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 301, 315 (2007) (“Functions once
thought to be at the heart of a particular agency’s responsibilities increasingly
have now been turned over to private entities . . . the definition of what is and
what is not inherently governmental has evolved considerably.”); Jody Freeman,
The Private Role in Public Governance, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 543, 579 (2000)
(“Ironically, . . . the historical pervasiveness of private activity may be largely
responsible for the ‘remarkable uselessness’ of state action doctrine in
constraining the private role in governance.”).
139. See, e.g., Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 170 (1970).
140. See, e.g., Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 723 (1961)
(finding restaurant that refused service to African American was a state actor
because it had a symbiotic relationship with the state-owned parking garage in
which it was located).
141. Compare id. at 723, with Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 35051 (1974) (finding public utility company not state actor despite heavy
regulation), and Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 171-72 (1972)
(holding private club’s refusal to serve African American was not state action
despite heavy regulation of liquor licensing).
142. See, e.g., Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1005 (1982) (finding no state
action where a nursing home relied on private medical decisions not compelled
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Finally, some have identified a fourth test, of
entwinement, as a result of the Supreme Court’s decision in
Brentwood Academy v. Tennessee Secondary School Athletic
Ass’n.143 The Court in Brentwood found the Tennessee
Secondary School Athletic Association to be a state actor,
notwithstanding the fact that it held itself out as a private
group comprised of public and private high schools, on the
grounds that it was “entwined” with government—84% of
the association’s members were public schools and
Tennessee implicitly acknowledged the association’s role in
regulating interscholastic athletics in the state.144 It remains
to be seen whether this possible emergence of
“entwinement” as a test for state action will functionally
serve as a revival of the traditional nexus or joint action
inquiry.
In practice, all of these various tests operate largely as
indicators of state action.145 There is no requirement that all
the tests be met, but neither do they function completely
independently from one another.146 Much ink has been
spilled on the topic of whether one type of entity or another
should be considered a state actor and under what

by the state in moving Medicaid patients to a lower level of care). The Court in
Blum notes that “constitutional standards are invoked only when it can be said
that the State is responsible for the specific conduct of which the plaintiff
complains.” Id. at 1004. Much depends on how broadly or narrowly you define
“the specific conduct of which the plaintiff complains.” See also Rendell-Baker v.
Kohn, 457 U.S. 830 (1982), discussed infra Part III.B.
143. 531 U.S. 288 (2001).
144. Id. at 299-301. In his dissenting opinion, Justice Thomas argues that
“entwinement” is a new test that “lacks any support in [the Court’s] state-action
jurisprudence.” Id. at 312 (Thomas, J., dissenting). He notes that the Court had
never before found state action based on “entwinement” alone. Id.
145. Cf. Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 939 (1982) (“Whether
these different tests are actually different in operation or simply different ways
of characterizing the necessarily fact-bound inquiry that confronts the Court in
such a situation need not be resolved here.”).
146. Cf. Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Back to the Briarpatch: An Argument in
Favor of Constitutional Meta-Analysis in State Action Determinations, 94 MICH.
L. REV. 302, 337 (1995) (“When a particular defendant does not satisfy any one
of the three state action tests, a reviewing court should step back and consider
whether the defendant satisfies a sufficient portion of each of the three tests to
support a state action finding, even if no single test is satisfied completely.”).
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circumstances,147 and—of relevance to our inquiry—the
Court has drawn increasingly fine lines between various
types of contract and pseudo-government employees. Thus,
for example, public defenders in the employ of the state are
not considered state actors because they operate in
opposition to the state,148 unless they conspire with the state
to deny a defendant his rights.149
B. State Action Doctrine as Applied to Schools: RendellBaker v. Kohn
1. The Court’s Decision in Rendell-Baker v. Kohn.
Although the Supreme Court has held that private actors
performing essential government functions may be held
accountable for their actions, as when state prisons
outsource the provision of medical care to inmates,150 the
legal landscape in the school context—and in the
disciplinary alternative school context in particular—seems
bleak. The Court held in Rendell-Baker v. Kohn151 that a
private company running a public school in Massachusetts
was not accountable as a state actor in a § 1983 action
brought by school employees.152 In so holding, the Court
specifically found public education not “traditionally the
exclusive prerogative of the State,”153 in marked contrast to
the provision of medical services in prisons.154
147. See, e.g., Richard L. Stone & Michael A. Perino, Not Just a Private Club:
Self Regulatory Organizations as State Actors When Enforcing Federal Law,
1995 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 453 (self-regulatory organizations should be
considered state actors); Justin A. McCarty, Note, The Volunteer Border Patrol:
The Inevitable Disaster of the Minuteman Project, 92 IOWA L. REV. 1459, 1481-86
(2007) (arguing that Minutemen should be considered state actors).
148. Polk Cnty. v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 324-25 (1981).
149. Tower v. Glover, 467 U.S. 914, 916 (1984).
150. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 56-57 (1988). Medical doctors under contract
with the state to provide services to prison inmates are considered state
employees and actors because inmates have no other alternative for medical
care. Id. at 47.
151. 457 U.S. 830 (1982).
152. Id. at 840-43.
153. Id. at 842.
154. This formulation of the test begs the question of what happens once
traditions have been eroded, when functions once performed exclusively by the
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Rendell-Baker
centered
around
a
disciplinary
alternative school that was publicly-funded in two senses: it
received both general monies from a number of state and
federal agencies and specific funds from nearby cities to
finance the education of the particular students those cities
had referred to the school.155 Nearly all of the students at
the school were referred to it by state entities.156 The school
was privately run, founded as a private institution and
governed by a private board of directors. 157 And the school
specialized “in dealing with students who have experienced
difficulty completing public high schools; many have drug,
alcohol, or behavioral problems, or other special needs.”158 In
other words, it was a publicly-funded privately-run
disciplinary alternative school.
The plaintiffs in Rendell-Baker were school employees
who claimed they had been wrongfully discharged without
due process in retaliation for exercising their First
Amendment rights.159 They filed suit under § 1983, claiming
violations of the First, Fifth, and Fourteenth
Amendments.160 The Court found they failed to state a claim
for which relief under § 1983 could be granted because the
decision to discharge them was not state action.161 In so
holding, the Court considered four factors and determined
that plaintiffs failed to make the necessary showing in any
of them to support a finding of state action.
First, the Court found the school’s reliance upon public
funding non-dispositive because such reliance was “not
fundamentally different from many private corporations
whose business depends primarily on contracts to build
roads, bridges, dams, ships, or submarines for the
states have been privatized for so long that they are no longer traditionally state
functions.
155. Rendell-Baker, 457 U.S. at 832 (“In recent years, public funds have
accounted for at least 90%, and in one year 99%, of respondent school’s
operating budget.”).
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 834.
160. Id. at 834-35.
161. Id. at 843.
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government. Acts of such private contractors do not become
acts of the government by reason of their significant or even
total engagement in performing public contracts.”162
Second, the Court found that the decision by the school
that formed the locus of petitioners’ complaint—the decision
to fire them—was not compelled or influenced by any state
regulation.163 Although the school itself was extensively
regulated, “the various regulators showed relatively little
interest in the school’s personnel matters” and the decision
to discharge was made by private management.164
Third, the Court found that the school did not perform a
“public function” in the sense required by traditional state
action doctrine.165 It noted that the test “is not simply
whether a private group is serving a public function” but
rather “whether the function performed has been
‘traditionally the exclusive prerogative of the State.’”166 The
school in question failed to meet this test because although
Massachusetts law made clear the state’s intent to pay for
the education of maladjusted high school students, it did not
make the provision of that education the “exclusive
province” of the state.167 In fact, as the Court pointed out,
Massachusetts had only recently undertaken the financial
burden of providing these services.168
Finally, the Court found no symbiotic relationship
between the school and the state, noting that the school’s
fiscal relationship with the state was no different from that
of any other contractor performing a service for the
government.169
2. Distinguishing Rendell-Baker in the Context of
Privately-Run Publicly-Funded Disciplinary Alternative
Schools. The Court’s primary concern in Rendell-Baker was
in cabining the state action doctrine to ensure that the mere
162. Id. at 840-41.
163. Id. at 841.
164. Id. at 841-42.
165. Id. at 842.
166. Id. (quoting Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 353 (1974)).
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 842-43.
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fact of contractual engagement by a government entity did
not convert private actors into state actors, making their
every action state action. The Court understandably wished
to avoid a situation in which the “private corporations
whose business depends primarily on contracts to build
roads, bridges, dams, ships, or submarines for the
government” would be exposed to new liability, particularly
for actions wholly unrelated to the subject of the
government contracts.170 A world in which businesses must
surrender their private status for all dealings with the
citizenry merely because they take on a government
contract is clearly untenable.
The holding in Rendell-Baker would appear to be a
nearly insurmountable barrier to finding state action
against
publicly-funded
privately-run
disciplinary
alternative schools. This Article contends, however, that
Rendell-Baker is in fact on its face inapplicable to the
situation contemplated, in which redress is sought on behalf
of students involuntarily placed in an institution that
violated their constitutional rights. Just as it cannot be that
every action taken by a government contractor is state
action, neither can it be no action taken by a government
contractor is ever state action. The question is where the
line ought to be drawn.
a. The Nature of the Service Provided. Where the action
in question—the violation of students’ constitutional
rights—goes to the core of the contracted-for government
service, the Court’s expressed concerns are not implicated.
Thus, in West v. Atkins, the Court held a private doctor
under contract with the state to provide medical services to
prison inmates to have acted under color of state law when
he treated an inmate, i.e., when he performed (albeit with
deliberate indifference) the very services for which he was
contracted.171
In contrast, Plaintiffs’ claims in Rendell-Baker had
nothing to do with the underlying government contract,
which required Defendants to provide educational services
to maladjusted high school students. Their claim of
wrongful discharge could have arisen in any employment
context and had nothing to do with the nature of the school
170. Id. at 840-41.
171. 487 U.S. 42, 57 (1988).
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or the services being provided by the school. In other words,
there was no evidence that the school had authority to
wrongfully discharge petitioners solely by virtue of being
cloaked with that authority from the state.
As the majority makes clear, to the extent the state had
in fact acted, its action was centered upon ensuring that
students at the school received an appropriate education
and not that personnel at the school would be treated in any
particular way: “[T]he decisions to discharge the petitioners
were not compelled or even influenced by any state
regulation. Indeed, in contrast to the extensive regulation of
the school generally, the various regulators showed
relatively little interest in the school’s personnel matters.”172
The focus on the nature of the service provided is
separate and distinct from an argument about the
public/non-public or essential/non-essential nature of that
service. The argument is not that the private actor
operating the school is a state actor because education is an
essential public service (an argument the Court has quite
clearly rejected), but rather that the private actor becomes a
state actor where its actions have been taken jointly with or
compelled or influenced in some way by the state. It is not
that the complained-of private action is a “public function,”
but that the action is indistinguishable from that taken by
the state itself.
b. Voluntary vs. Involuntary Attendance. Another
critical factor in distinguishing the suit brought by school
employees in Rendell-Baker and a hypothetical suit brought
by students, is that the employees are not obligated by law
to work at that particular school, or even to work at all.
Students, in contrast, are subject to compulsory education
laws, and students attending disciplinary alternative
schools are often required by the state (whether via court
order or school board referral) to attend that particular
school.
The First Circuit’s preceding opinion further
underscores the difference between employees of a school,
172. Rendell-Baker, 457 U.S. at 841. Justice White’s concurrence further
underscores this important distinction: “For me, the critical factor is the absence
of any allegation that the employment decision was itself based upon some rule
of conduct or policy put forth by the State. . . . The employment decision
remains, therefore, a private decision not fairly attributable to the State.” Id. at
844 (White, J., concurring).
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The “public function” concept is strongest, moreover, when
asserted by those for whose benefit the state has undertaken to
perform a service, or when the state has lent its coercive powers to
a private party. In this situation, for example, those students of
the [school] who were placed there by their local school committee,
particularly those who are compelled to attend under the state’s
compulsory education laws, would have a stronger argument than
do plaintiffs that the school’s action towards them is taken “under
color of” state law, since the school derives its authority over them
173
from the state.

Students who have been involuntarily referred to a
disciplinary alternative school, in other words, are forced to
rely upon the state for educational services much as the
prison inmate in West v. Atkins was forced to rely upon the
state-contracted doctor for medical services. As some
commentators have noted, the critical distinction between
the Court’s finding in West, where the provision of medical
care to inmates was considered state action, and RendellBaker, where the provision of education was not, was the
voluntariness of attendance at the institution in question
and thus the monopoly the state functionally maintained on
the services provided.174
The Rendell-Baker dissent systematically builds a case
for a “symbiotic relationship” in which the school and the
state were “participants in a joint venture,”175 relying upon
the “cumulative impact” of the state funding and
supervision.176 The Court’s categorical rejection of this
approach may mean the death of the joint action test for
state action at its broadest interpretation, under which
participation in a joint venture with the government
converts all private activities in connection with the joint
venture into state action.
173. Rendell-Baker v. New Perspectives Sch. Inc., 641 F.2d 14, 26 (1st Cir.
1981) (emphasis omitted), aff’d, 457 U.S. 830 (1982).
174. Countryman, supra note 76, at 534.
175. Rendell-Baker, 457 U.S. at 847 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
176. Id. at 848 n.1. In fact, commentators who advocate for a looser
interpretation of state action doctrine, in the form of “meta-analysis,” point to
Rendell-Baker as an example of a case that would come out differently. See, e.g.,
Krotoszynski, supra note 146, at 343-44.
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Speculation aside, Rendell-Baker makes the Court’s
current position clear: even if the joint action test survives,
it does so in a much narrower form than previously applied
by the Court, and confers state action status only upon
those particular activities in which the state was actually a
joint participant. The action in question—in Rendell-Baker,
the decision to discharge the employees—must itself be the
product of joint action. Whether this reading of the joint
action test constitutes a departure from the Court’s previous
interpretations or is so narrow as to make meaningless the
distinction between the joint action and state compulsion
tests, is irrelevant to our inquiry.
The fact that the school in Rendell-Baker happened to
be a privately-run publicly-funded disciplinary alternative
school is thus no more relevant to our inquiry than the
NCAA arrangements addressed by the Court in NCAA v.
Tarkanian177 or the Tennessee Secondary School Athletic
Association’s issues addressed by Brentwood.178 Although
each of these cases took place in a school context, the claims
were not particular to that context. Rendell-Baker is a red
herring in the context of disciplinary alternative schools
with respect to claims brought by students involuntarily
referred to the school and who seek redress for violation of
rights that go to the core of the underlying government
contract.
C. Post Rendell-Baker in the Lower Courts: A Circuit Split
In the wake of the Supreme Court’s decision in RendellBaker, lower courts dealing with student suits against
similar schools have taken different approaches to the state
action issue. There is little agreement on the extent to
which Rendell-Baker directly governs and/or precludes
student-initiated suits.
In fact, although this Article does not discuss cases in
which a school employee files suit, which are ostensibly
governed by Rendell-Baker, there is little agreement
amongst the lower court cases even on that front.179
177. 488 U.S. 179 (1988).
178. 531 U.S. 288 (2001).
179. Compare, e.g., Caviness v. Horizon Cmty. Learning Ctr., 590 F.3d 806,
814-15 (9th Cir. 2010) (finding a private non-profit corporation running charter
school was not a state actor in employment action and citing Rendell-Baker),
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Similarly, this Article does not deal with purely private
schools unaffiliated in any way with the state or with postsecondary education, as attendance at those schools is
completely voluntary,180 but there is some disagreement in
the lower court cases with respect to those cases as well—
particularly with regard to post-secondary education.181 And,
of course, there are some lower court opinions that reach

Johnson v. Pinkerton Acad., 861 F.2d 335, 337-38 (1st Cir. 1988) (relying on
Rendell-Baker to find private school not state actor), and McCann v. Tex.
Vocational Sch., 2005 WL 1653084, at *4 (S.D. Tex. July 8, 2005) (finding
vocational school was not a state actor in employment action because plaintiff
did not allege a “symbiotic relationship” or “close nexus”), with Riester v.
Riverside Cmty. Sch., 257 F. Supp. 2d 968, 972-73 (S.D. Ohio 2002) (finding
privately-run public school was a state actor because school provided free public
education, and distinguishing Rendell-Baker).
180. Cf. infra Part III.C.1.
181. Regarding private schools, see, for example, Cummings v. Office of
Catholic Educ., No. Civ.A. 05-104, 2005 WL 1124103, at *2 (E.D. Pa. May 11,
2005) (private Catholic school not state actor); Watson v. St. Luke Acad., No. 04
C 2472, 2005 WL 281227, at *5 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 2, 2005) (private religious school
not state actor); Nobles v. Ala. Christian Acad., 917 F. Supp. 786, 789 (M.D. Ala.
1996) (rejecting plaintiff’s argument that state exercised “such a coercive
influence over private schools as to make the school’s decisions those of the
state”). But see Curran v. Bureau of Special Educ. Appeals, 3 Mass. L. Rep. 1, 12 (Mass Super. Ct. 1994) (finding private school state actor). Regarding postsecondary education, compare Pik v. Univ. of Pa., No. 08-5164, 2010 WL
3933275, at *7 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 7, 2010) (University of Pennsylvania not state
actor), Becker v. City Univ. of Seattle, 723 F. Supp. 2d 807, 810 (E.D. Pa. 2010)
(City University of Seattle not state actor), Curto v. Smith, 248 F. Supp. 2d 132,
139-40 (N.D.N.Y. 2003) (veterinary school not state actor), Johnson v. Suffolk
Univ., No. Civ.A. 02-12603-PBS, 2002 WL 31426734, at *1 (D. Mass. Oct. 28,
2002) (Suffolk University not state actor), Hack v. President & Fellows of Yale
Coll., 16 F. Supp. 2d 183, 192 (D. Conn. 1998) (Yale College not state actor),
Tynecki v. Tufts Univ. Sch. of Dental Med., 875 F. Supp. 26, 33 (D. Mass. 1994)
(private dental school not state actor), and Stone v. Dartmouth Coll., 682 F.
Supp. 106, 110 (D.N.H. 1988) (Dartmouth College not state actor), with Albert v.
Carovano, 824 F.2d 1333, 1341 (2d Cir. 1987) (Hamilton College state actor),
Krynicky v. Univ. of Pittsburgh, 742 F.2d 94, 103 (3d Cir. 1984) (University of
Pittsburgh and Temple University state actors), and McGrath v. Dominican
Coll. of Blauvelt, 672 F. Supp. 2d 477, 489-91 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (Dominican
College state actor). This Article also omits discussion of cases in which the
complained of action is student action. See, e.g., Yeo v. Town of Lexington, 131
F.3d 241, 251-55 (1st Cir. 1997) (finding action of student editors running school
yearbook and newspaper not state action).
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the merits of a constitutional claim without any discussion
of state action whatsoever.182
The vast majority of cases filed are individual in nature
and seek retrospective relief, i.e., they are brought on behalf
of one plaintiff (as opposed to a class) and seek damages for
a particular injury that happened in the past (as opposed to
prospective injunctive relief). Examination of these cases,
combined with the few that have been filed for prospective
injunctive relief reveals that although the courts differ
widely in their approach to the state action issue, two
factors weigh heavily in their analysis: whether attendance
at the educational facility in question was voluntary or
involuntary, and how shocking the underlying facts of the
alleged injury are. Although neither of these factors is an
official part of any of the Supreme Court’s oft-cited “tests” to
divine the presence of state action, they both nevertheless
appear to be excellent predictors of whether such action will
be detected.
1. Involuntary Attendance. Irrespective of other tests
indicating state action, the factor of involuntary attendance
is outcome-determinative for many lower courts. In other
words, courts may find in favor of state action should there
be involuntary attendance (perhaps in conjunction with
other indicators of state action) but few courts are willing to
find state action if attendance is voluntary (even in
conjunction with other indicators of state action).
a. No State Action—Voluntary Attendance. The Third
Circuit’s decision in Robert S. v. Stetson School, Inc.,183
underscores the importance of voluntary attendance—and
the potential narrowness of the definition of “voluntary.”184
182. See, e.g., Daugherty v. Vanguard Charter Sch. Acad., 116 F. Supp. 2d 897,
906 (W.D. Mich. 2000) (addressing whether complained-of actions by private
company operating charter school were pursuant to official policy or established
custom under § 1983 without discussion of state action); Jones v. SABIS Educ.
Sys., Inc., 52 F. Supp. 2d 868, 878 (N.D. Ill. 1999) (same).
183. 256 F.3d 159 (3d Cir. 2001).
184. Interestingly, plaintiff in this case initially survived summary judgment
at the district court level. Kathryn P. v. City of Philadelphia, No. Civ.A. 976710, 1999 WL 391492, at *4 (E.D. Pa. May 27, 1999). That court noted that the
plaintiff was a ward of the state and that “a school can be both a state actor
when its students are assigned by the state and a private actor when its
students are assigned by their parents.” Id. at *4 & n.3. The district court
ultimately ruled against plaintiff after an evidentiary hearing. Robert S. v. City

656

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 60

Because the plaintiff was in the temporary custody of the
Philadelphia Department of Human Services and that
agency placed him at the school in question in its capacity
as his legal guardian, the court—in an opinion written by
then-Judge Alito—found:
Whether or not Robert, a minor at the time in question, personally
wanted to attend the [school], his legal custodian, DHS, wanted
him placed there, and his mother consented. Thus, his enrollment
at [the school] was not “involuntary” in the sense relevant here,
i.e., he was not deprived of his liberty in contravention of his legal
185
custodian’s (or his mother’s) wishes.

Just as attendance at a school would not be considered
involuntary if the minor resisted but the parent insisted,
here the Third Circuit determined that the student had
functionally been enrolled at the school by his parent, i.e.,
his legal guardian, the Department of Human Services.186 As
other commentators have pointed out, this approach means
that wards of the state forfeit their ability to raise any civil
rights claims against private institutions in which the state
places them.187

of Philadelphia, No. 97-6710, 2000 WL 288111, at *6 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 17, 2000). It
determined the school was “not a prison or a juvenile detention facility, and the
students are not locked down . . . . [Plaintiff] was never adjudicated a juvenile
delinquent, or ordered to attend [the school] by any court.” Id. at *5.
185. Robert S., 256 F.3d at 166-67. The egregiousness of the complained of
behavior, or lack thereof, may also have played a role in the court’s decision:
[S]tudents were not placed in solitary confinement, discouraged from
seeing visitors, required to take lie detector tests, or subjected to
censorship of their mail. On the contrary, it is undisputed that Robert
was allowed to leave campus with an instructor, had regular contact
with his family (including frequent visits with his mother and stepfather), was allowed to leave campus with his family, and was even
allowed to go home for vacations.
Id. at 168.
186. This finding would not preclude liability against the state agency for its
state action—the act of referring the plaintiff to the school in the first place. See
Doe v. Westlake Acad., No. 97-2187, 2000 WL 35499064, at *1, *12-14 (Mass.
Super. Ct. Nov. 20, 2000) (finding no state action where plaintiff was a ward of
the state civilly committed to a secure residential treatment).
187. Sacha M. Coupet, The Subtlety of State Action in Privatized Child Welfare
Services, 11 CHAP. L. REV. 85, 115 (2007).
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In S.G. v. Care Academy, Inc.,188 the Western District of
Kentucky notes that the Academy is a private school, that
state law did not mandate the strip searches of which
plaintiff complained,189 and that the plaintiff “was not forced
to enroll by court order or other adjudicative process, and
indeed freely withdrew after the incident in question.”190
Similarly, in Robertson v. Red Rock Canyon School, LLC,191
the District of Utah concluded that there was no state
action in a case involving the voluntary placement of a
student at a specialized boarding school for “at-risk
youth[s].”192
b. State Action—Involuntary Attendance. In Milonas v.
Williams,193 the Tenth Circuit found a private school to
which many students had been involuntarily referred for
special education services was a state actor.194 The school
was privately owned and operated, but received public
monies and also operated as a correctional and detention
facility, and as a mental health facility.195 The plaintiff was
involuntarily committed to the school by his mother, but the
commitment was a condition of probation imposed by a
juvenile court.196 The court concluded that the state had so
insinuated itself with the school as to be considered a joint
participant and distinguished Rendell-Baker: “The plaintiffs
in the present case are not employees, but students, some of
whom have been involuntarily placed in the school by state

188. No. 3:09-CV-422-S, 2010 WL 1416717 (W.D. Ky. Mar. 31, 2010).
189. Id. at *3. The court is, of course, incorrect as a matter of law that state
law must mandate the complained-of actions. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167,
171-72 (1961) (holding that city police officers who conducted an illegal search
and seizure were state actors).
190. Care Academy, 2010 WL 1416717, at *3.
191. No. 2:05-CV-758 TC, 2006 WL 3041469 (D. Utah Oct. 24, 2006).
192. Id. at *1, *3. The court noted that “Plaintiffs do not allege that [the
school’s] decision to house [plaintiff] in another unit with unsupervised sexual
predators was in any way directed, controlled, or influenced by a governmental
entity.” Id. at *5.
193. 691 F.2d 931 (10th Cir. 1982).
194. Id. at 939.
195. Id. at 935-36.
196. Id. at 936.
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officials who were aware of, and approved of, certain of the
practices which the district court has now enjoined.”197
A series of § 1983 cases in the late 1990s and into 2000
that challenged conditions at a number of juvenile detention
facilities in Louisiana, which also provided educational
services, are instructive as well.198 The daily operation of the
facilities had been outsourced to a series of private
corporations and the facilities were intended to provide,
among other services, education and rehabilitation for the
youths held therein.199 Attendance at the facilities was
involuntary.200 The various cases were consolidated in
Williams v. McKeithen, and although the parties reached a
settlement agreement that bound both the relevant state
agencies and private corporations, there was no apparent
discussion of state action.201
2. Injury Shocking to the Conscience.202 In Logiodice v.
Trustees of Maine Central Institute, the First Circuit
197. Id. at 940.
198. Williams v. McKeithen, 121 F. Supp. 2d 943 (M.D. La. 2000)
(consolidation of ten § 1983 cases).
199. See, e.g., Amended Complaint, Brian B., supra note 87, ¶ 34 (naming
private corporation under contract with state as defendant); Complaint, A.A.,
supra note 118, ¶ 21 (same).
200. The complaints alleged various violations of plaintiffs’ First, Fourth,
Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights, including the use of
excessive force, summary discipline practices, and inadequate care. See, e.g.,
Amended Complaint, Brian B., supra note 87; Complaint, A.A., supra note 118.
201. Williams, 121 F. Supp. 2d at 945-48 (“The term ‘State’ shall refer to . . .
employees, agents, contractors, and successors . . . who are wholly or partially
responsible for the care of juveniles confined in the juvenile facilities . . . .”). At
least two similar cases were filed in 2010, also with no mention of the state
action requirement. Amended Complaint, D.L., supra note 87, ¶¶ 8, 16-18 (suing
private company under contract with the state with no mention of state action
requirement); Complaint ¶¶ 1, 22-28, C.B. v. Walnut Grove Corr. Auth., No.
3:10CV663 DPS-FKB (S.D. Miss. Nov. 16, 2010) (same). Another case, D.W. v.
Harrison County, named only the state entity but resulted in a settlement
agreement that bound both the state and “the MSP [Mississippi Security Police,
a private security company], as a contractor of the Defendant.” Memorandum of
Agreement at 2, D.W. v. Harrison Cnty., No. 1:09-cv-267-LG-RHN (S.D. Miss.
Apr. 20, 2009).
202. This terminology draws upon the formulation used by the Court in
Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952) to denote behavior that is so
egregious it constitutes a substantive due process violation even in the absence
of a fundamental right. It is used informally here to signal those types of
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declined to find the trustees of the Maine Central Institute
state actors.203 The school in question was a privately-run
facility under contract with several Maine school districts to
educate all children in those districts.204 The court noted
that the trustees served as private citizens; that the
complained-of action involved student discipline, which the
school contract left wholly to the discretion of the trustees;
and that the plaintiff was not required to attend that
particular school.205
The underlying claim in Logiodice was over a de facto
seventeen-day suspension the plaintiff received for cursing
at a teacher.206 Thus, although the plaintiff arguably
satisfied the involuntary attendance factor, the facts of his
claim might have been insufficiently shocking to motivate
the court to find state action, as evidenced by the court’s
referral to the “small arguable unfairnesses that are part of
life.”207
Conversely, some allegations can be so shocking that
even the fact of voluntary attendance will not dissuade a
court from finding state action. In Scaggs v. New York
Department of Education, the Eastern District of New York
found a charter school to be a state actor even though
attendance at the school was voluntary.208 Plaintiffs alleged
the school utterly failed to meet any of the requirements to
which it was subject under the Individuals with Disabilities
in Education Act; that the school was lacking in essentials
such as books, pens, pencils, and paper; and that the school

injuries to which the lower courts have been more sympathetic, without
judgment as to whether “bad facts have made bad law.”
203. 296 F.3d 22, 31 (1st Cir. 2002).
204. Id. at 24-25.
205. Id. at 28-29.
206. Id. at 25.
207. Id. at 29-30. Interestingly, the court did note that the school in question
was in fact the “school of last resort” for plaintiff, as it was “for those in the
community the only regular education available for which the state will pay.”
Id. at 27, 29.
208. Scaggs v. N.Y. Dep’t. of Educ., No. 06-cv-0799 (JFB)(VVP), 2007 WL
1456221 at * 1, *13 (E.D.N.Y. 2007).
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was a chaotic and violent environment that was insect and
rodent infested to boot.209
Finally, even a shocking injury will not suffice for a
finding of state action if there are so many “intervening
causes” that the court finds the injury too attenuated from
the state—unless, perhaps, the injury is particularly
shocking.210
3. Strict Liability for Outsourcing. A handful of courts
have followed the approach the Court took in West v. Atkins,
which held that a private doctor under contract with a
prison system to provide medical services to inmates acted
under color of state law and was liable under § 1983 for
deliberate indifference.211 The Court in Atkins reasoned that
contracting out a state responsibility could not relieve the
state of its constitutional duties or deprive those in the
state’s care of a means to vindicate their constitutional
rights:
[I]f this were the basis for delimiting § 1983 liability, the state will
be free to contract out all services which it is constitutionally
obligated to provide and leave its citizens with no means for
209. Id. at *8. The court distinguished Rendell-Baker on the grounds that
plaintiffs’ claims “relate to the alleged total inadequacy of a school to provide
free public education to its students while receiving state funding, being bound
to state educational standards and purporting to offer the same educational
services and facilities as any other public school.” Id. at *13.
210. Compare Hamlin v. City of Peekskill Bd. of Educ., 377 F. Supp. 2d 379,
385-90 (S.D.N.Y. 2005), with Susavage v. Bucks Cnty. Sch. Intermediate Unit
No. 22, No. Civ.A. 00-6217, 2002 WL 109615, at *10-11 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 22, 2002).
In Hamlin, the court declined to find state action where a special needs student
whose education was publicly funded was placed on a privately operated school
bus and coerced into committing a sexual act by another student on the bus.
Hamlin, 377 F. Supp. 2d at 381-85. The injury was committed by a fellow
student and there was no evidence the state itself “had any control over what
happened to the children while [at the school], and specifically over how they
were put on the school bus.” Id. at 390. Interestingly, the court notes that the
case did not present a “problem of a State encouraging the formation and
function of ‘private’ schools in order to evade constitutional requirements with
respect to public ones.” Id. at 387 n.4. In contrast, in Susavage, the court
permitted recovery where plaintiff was also a special needs student whose
education was publicly funded and who was placed on a privately operated
school bus. Susavage, 2002 WL 109615 at *1. The plaintiff in Susavage,
however, was strangled to death by an improper harness restraint on the bus.
Id. at *2.
211. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 57-58 (1988).
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vindication of those rights, whose protection has been delegated to
private actors, when they have been denied.212

Much as the Rendell-Baker court sought to avoid a
world in which all government contractors are liable as
state actors in all of their actions, courts following the strict
liability approach seek to avoid a world in which
government and its contractors can evade liability
altogether. The extent of the complainant’s injuries or the
degree to which the state was involved in the particular
decision to treat become irrelevant; as soon as the state
contracts out a particular type of service, state action is
implicated.
For example, in Magagna v. Salisbury Township School
District,213 the Eastern District of Pennsylvania found that a
school employee under contract with a non-profit
corporation that in turn contracted with a public school
district to provide alternative instruction for special needs
students was a state actor.214 The court distinguished
Rendell-Baker on the grounds that the suit was brought by
a student, as opposed to a school employee, and that the
school in question was public, not private.215 Thus, although
the actions at issue were committed by an individual
employed by a private corporation rather than the school
district, “it is the nature of one’s actions rather than the
titular status of one’s employer which determines whether
§ 1983 applies.”216 The court noted that finding otherwise
would mean “a public entity could avoid § 1983 liability
simply by using private surrogates to do the job for which
the public actor is chartered.”217

212. Id. at 56 n.14 (quoting West v. Atkins, 815 F.2d 993, 998 (4th Cir. 1987)
(Winter, J., dissenting)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
213. No. Civ.A. 98-1033, 1998 WL 961906 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 29, 1998).
214. Id. at *1-2.
215. Id. at *2 n.2.
216. Id. at *2.
217. Id.; see also J.K. v. Dillenberg, 836 F. Supp. 694, 699 (D. Ariz. 1993) (“The
public policy implications of Defendants’ position, if accepted, would be
devastating. It is patently unreasonable to presume that Congress would permit
a state to disclaim federal responsibilities by contracting away its obligations to
a private entity.”).
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4. Making Sense of the Lower Court Split. The diversity
in analysis and outcome reflected in these lower court
opinions reflects the confusion sown by the Supreme Court’s
decisions on state action to date. The courts appear to have
settled (for the most part) on two elements of a
complainant’s claim as being dispositive of the presence of
state action: the voluntariness with which the complainant
attended the institution in question, and the seriousness of
her injuries. Neither of these factors is an “official” element
of any test for state action articulated by the Court and the
use of the latter factor is often not even explicit.
Neither factor, moreover, is a particularly good
indicator of state action. Injury shocking to the conscience is
highly subjective, which is one of the reasons the Rochin
test218 has fallen into disuse. It also places a critical
constitutional determination at the mercy of judges’
empathetic feelings.
The fact of involuntary attendance may reflect the
presence of state action, as we shall see below, but lower
courts relying upon this factor typically point to it for the
wrong reasons. The point of involuntary attendance is not
that the act of referral to the school itself constitutes the
requisite state action, because the referring entity is
invariably a state agency or official, e.g., a judge or local
school board. Private individuals do not (yet) have the
authority to involuntarily commit juveniles to particular
institutions, so the act of referral itself as state action fails
to present a meaningful question of state action.
The much harder issue presents itself after a student
has been involuntarily committed to a particular school:
whether the ostensibly private party in whose custody that
student has been placed constitutes a state actor. This
Article contends that the answer should be yes, in part
because referral was involuntary—but only because the
involuntary referral makes the student a captive audience,
subject to the authority of the private entity only by virtue
of the state’s power, and where the private entity has
authority only by virtue of power granted to it by the state.

218. See supra note 202 and accompanying text.
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IV. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF STATE ACTION
Litigation under § 1983 has a venerable history dating
back to the post-Civil War era, reflecting the statute’s
original purpose: to help African Americans vindicate their
right not to be discriminated against during Reconstruction
and its aftermath.219 At the core of § 1983 is the recognition
that governments are fallible, that mistakes will be made,
rights will be violated, and that redress must be had. 220
Redress is necessary not just for the benefit of the wronged
party, but also to deter future wrongs, as “an incentive for
officials who may harbor doubts about the lawfulness of
their intended actions to err on the side of protecting
citizens’ constitutional rights.”221 Section 1983 further serves
to enforce public norms of conduct,222 and to ensure the
continued accountability of government to its people, for
there can be no greater breach of trust than a constitutional

219. See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION § 8.2 (2d ed. 1994).
220. As the Court has noted:
The absence of any damages remedy for violations of all but the most
“clearly established” constitutional rights . . . could also have the
deleterious effect of freezing constitutional law in its current state of
development, for without a meaningful remedy aggrieved individuals
will have little incentive to seek vindication of those constitutional
deprivations that have not previously been clearly defined.
Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 651 n.33 (1980) (citation omitted).
221. Id. at 652. In Owen, the Court denied a good faith defense to
municipalities under § 1983. Id. at 624-25; see also DeShaney v. Winnebago
Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 211 (1989) (Brennan, J., dissenting)
(noting the desirability of having a “state actor stop and think before she acts in
a way that may lead to a loss of liberty”).
222. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr. & Daniel J. Meltzer, New Law, NonRetroactivity, and Constitutional Remedies, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1731, 1787 (1991)
(“Constitutional remedies serve two basic functions in the constitutional
scheme. The first is to redress individual violations. The slogan ‘for every right,
a remedy’ reflects this purpose. The second function is related but distinct: to
reinforce structural values, including those underlying the separation of powers
and the rule of law.”); cf. Jack M. Beermann, Why Do Plaintiffs Sue Private
Parties Under Section 1983?, 26 CARDOZO L. REV. 9, 11 (2004) (“[The] application
of public norms to private conduct presents the possibility that such norms could
become more broadly applicable to private parties, much like a similar
phenomenon that occurred in the area of anti-discrimination norms.”).
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injury committed by the very government officials to whom
we entrust ourselves.223
These powerful motivations have resulted in a powerful
remedy. Although the Court has limited the scope of parties
to whom § 1983 applies, particularly in the post-Warren
Court era and in cases not involving racial discrimination,224
litigants seeking redress would be ill-advised to be
persuaded of the premature death of the doctrine
altogether. Some scholars have contended that although the
doctrine
“may
succeed
in
extraordinary
cases,
. . . it cannot discipline the excesses—or facilitate the proper
functioning—of the vast majority of arrangements in which
private parties play a significant role.”225 Where the doctrine
does apply, however—as this Article contends it does where
attendance at an outsourced institution is compelled by the
state—it is a doctrine that provides unique relief,
unavailable under any other type of legal claim.
There are, at the outset, a number of practical
advantages § 1983 offers litigants over claims in tort or
other common law claims:
[T]he availability of attorney’s fees for prevailing plaintiffs; the
ability to bring claims in federal court rather than in state court
or in a state claims tribunal; a potentially longer statute of
limitations; a potentially more generous measure of damages
(including the possibility of punitive damages); and the
inapplicability of various state procedural impediments, such as
notice of claim requirements or mandatory pre-screening where
inadequate medical care is alleged. . . . [S]ome litigants, such as
state prisoners, may feel more comfortable bringing federal claims
against their state antagonists. . . . The most fundamental
substantive reason for seeking remedies under section 1983 is

223. See Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 222, at 1789 (“There historically always
have been, and predictably will continue to be, cases in which effective
individual redress is unavailable. This is regrettable, but tolerable. What would
be intolerable is a regime of public administration that was systematically
unanswerable to the restraints of law, as identified from a relatively detached
and independent judicial perspective.”).
224. Cf. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, CONSTITUTIONAL CHOICES 251 (1985) (“Burton [v.
Wilmington Parking Authority]’s symbiosis analysis remains the high-water
mark in a tide of state action doctrine that has since been almost constantly at
ebb.”).
225. Freeman, supra note 138, at 579.
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that there may be no liability under state law for much of the
conduct that gives rise to section 1983 claims. 226

Some of these reasons undoubtedly apply in the context
of publicly-funded privately-run disciplinary alternative
schools; others may not, depending upon the facts of the
particular case.
To this list, we may add the following, more compelling
reasons—more compelling because they relate to the
underlying structural purposes of vindicating one’s
constitutional rights, rather than to advantages conveyed in
litigation posture.
A. Injunctive Relief
For some plaintiffs, “it is damages or nothing” because
they simply do not satisfy the requirements for injunctive
relief.227 There are a host of harms for which purely
retrospective relief—most often in the form of damages—are
sufficient to make the injured party whole. For example,
one-time injuries caused by the classic “bad apple,” or rogue
employee, are easily resolved via individual cases seeking
relief under a variety of tort and common law claims for
which a finding of state action is wholly unnecessary. 228
Conversely, for other plaintiffs, no amount of damages can
make them whole, i.e., they have no “adequate remedy at
law” and therefore qualify for equitable relief.229 The classic
226. Beermann, supra note 222, at 14; see also Frankel, supra note 11, at
1511-12 (“The lure of attorney’s fees makes it possible for aggrieved plaintiffs to
bring § 1983 actions that perhaps might not be brought if the only remedy were
under state common law, especially in cases where the level of damages is
relatively low.”).
227. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403
U.S. 388, 410 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring); see also City of Los Angeles v.
Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 110-11 (1983) (finding plaintiff lacked standing to seek
injunctive relief barring city from using chokeholds because there was no
serious risk that he would again be subjected to one, but noting the availability
of damages).
228. Cf. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 407-08 (1997)
(distinguishing between constitutionally “deficient training ‘program’
necessarily intended to apply over time to multiple employees” and single
instance of unconstitutional behavior by municipal employee).
229. O’Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 492, 502 (1974) (“[Plaintiffs must]
establish the basic requisites of the issuance of equitable relief in these
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case of court-ordered injunctive relief is Brown v. Board of
Education230: the idea that school segregation might be
resolved via damages awards is simply impracticable.231
Prospective injunctive relief is not only suitable, but
arguably irreplaceable, in the context of a pattern and
practice of rights abuses such that a critical mass of
students at a school faces “the likelihood of substantial and
immediate irreparable injury.”232 It is only with prospective
injunctive relief that plaintiffs may obtain, for example, a
court order declaring that the school’s disciplinary policies
and practices violate the Fourteenth Amendment due
process requirement and an injunction mandating that the
school change these policies and practices.233 Injunctive
relief may also be preferable to punitive damages even
where both are available when damages fail to impact the
company in question (whether because of its financial
situation or sheer intransigence) or when damages may put
the school out of business altogether, leaving parents with
no educational alternative for their children.234
Finally, it is worth noting that if only the actual state
agency’s actions are subject to injunctive relief, e.g., the
state agency’s act of referral, the injunctive relief available
is insufficient to remedy the harm to which students
attending the school are at imminent risk of suffering. First,
it is unclear whether students already attending the school
would have standing to bring a claim for injunctive relief
seeking to stop referrals, and second, a court injunction
barring or governing future referrals to the school does not
provide relief for students already there.235 The theory of
circumstances—the likelihood of substantial and immediate irreparable injury,
and the inadequacy of remedies at law.”).
230. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
231. OWEN M. FISS, THE CIVIL RIGHTS INJUNCTION 80 (1978).
232. O’Shea, 414 U.S. at 502.
233. Cf. FISS, supra note 231, at 91 (“[The choice of remedy] should . . . turn
upon an appreciation of the technical advantages of each remedy and a
judgment, made in light of the substantive claim, about the desirability of the
allocation of power that is implicit in each remedial system.”).
234. See infra Part IV.C for additional discussion of the inadequacy of
damages relief under tort and contract claims.
235. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992) (holding
that plaintiffs must allege “injury in fact” that is “concrete and particularized
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state action must therefore be one of entwinement or joint
action, such that injunctive relief may be procured against
both the state and private actor for actions taken by school
employees.236
B. Public and Constitutional Accountability
In addition to the availability of injunctive relief, § 1983
provides an important means of generating public and
constitutional accountability. The Constitution and the
public are done a disservice if both government and private
entities are able to avoid constitutional liabilities to which
they would otherwise be subject, the former by subcontracting to the latter, and the latter by virtue of being
private.237 The question is not that which is posed by
and actual or imminent”; and that “it must be likely, as opposed to merely
speculative, that the injury will be redressable by a favorable decision” (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted)); City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S.
95, 110-11 (1983) (holding plaintiff who had been injured by police chokehold
lacked standing to seek injunctive relief prohibiting use of chokeholds because
he did not allege imminent risk that he would again be placed in chokehold by
police); O’Shea, 414 U.S. at 495-96 (“Past exposure to illegal conduct does not in
itself show a present case or controversy regarding injunctive relief . . . if
unaccompanied by any continuing, present adverse effects.”).
236. Larry Tribe suggests otherwise, arguing in his book, Constitutional
Choices, that a particularly useful avenue for circumventing the symbiosis
analysis “almost constantly at ebb” with the Court is to sue only the “state
officials who possess the power, by virtue of the state rules at issue, to put
‘private’ actors in a position to inflict injury—for example, by delegating
governmental or monopoly power to private entities.” TRIBE, supra note 224, at
251, 255. Thus, rather than suing the private club who denied him a drink, the
plaintiff in Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972), should have sued
the members of the Pennsylvania liquor control board for “suborning racism and
aggravating its impact by handing out the privilege of a scarce liquor license
without regard to the licensee’s racist practices.” TRIBE, supra note 224, at 255.
Tribe concedes that “[i]t is, of course, possible that the plaintiff would still have
lost on the merits, given the difficulty of demonstrating a significant net impact
on minority drinking opportunities and, more importantly, given the potential
requirement of proving a discriminatory governmental purpose . . . .” Id. at 425
n.82.
237. See supra text accompanying note 212 (quote from West v. Atkins, 487
U.S. 42, 56 n.14 (1988)); cf. Flagg Bros. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 163-64 (1978)
(“We express no view as to the extent, if any, to which a city or State might be
free to delegate to private parties the performance of such functions [as
education, fire and police protection, and tax collection] and thereby avoid the
strictures of the Fourteenth Amendment.”).
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nondelegation doctrine, i.e., whether such delegations
should be permissible, but rather, once we permit such
delegations, whether and how government and the private
parties with which it contracts should be held
accountable.238
One scholar defines accountability as “being answerable
to authority that can mandate desirable conduct and
sanction conduct that breaches identified obligations.”239
Ensuring accountability for entities performing privatized
government functions is a particularly pressing issue when
the functions they perform become increasingly broad—and
even more so when they involve vulnerable populations.240
Of course, as another scholar notes, accountability can itself
“create perverse incentives where the political benefits of

238. Cf. Freeman, supra note 138, at 586 (“[T]he time has come to accept
private delegations as a fact of life. This is not to deny that some delegations
will be problematic—only that, as a general matter, we should focus on how to
structure these arrangements effectively and milk their positive potential.”).
This Article does not take a position on what types of immunities, if any, should
be afforded to private actors once a finding of state action has been made. The
Court has ruled that history and policy weigh against providing qualified
immunity in the context of prison guards and attachment cases, e.g., Richardson
v. McKnight, 521 U.S. 399, 412 (1997), but the prison context does not
necessarily provide a template for the education context. For additional
background on immunities in the post-state action context, see, for example,
Barbara Kritchevsky, Civil Rights Liability of Private Entities, 26 CARDOZO L.
REV. 35, 78 (2004) (arguing private parties should not have access to qualified
immunity); Sheldon Nahmod, The Emerging Section 1983 Private Party Defense,
26 CARDOZO L. REV. 81, 82 (2004) (arguing private parties should have access to
a good faith defense, as distinguished from qualified immunity).
239. Minow, supra note 12, at 1260; see also Jack M. Beermann, Privatization
and Political Accountability, 28 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1507, 1509 (2001) (“Political
accountability should be understood to include the democratic character of
decision-making, the clarity of responsibility for an action or policy within the
political system, and the ability of the body politic to obtain accurate
information about a governmental policy or action.”).
240. See, e.g., Bruce Ackerman, The New Separation of Powers, 113 HARV. L.
REV. 633, 724 (2000) (“Because . . . the victims of ignorance, poverty, and
prejudice generally have a hard time mobilizing themselves for effective political
action . . . most politicians will usually maximize their reelection chances by
giving greater weight to the interests of the rich and the educated.”); Minow,
supra note 12, at 1259 (“The urgent question posed by a shifting mix of public
and private providers of education, welfare, and prison services is how to ensure
genuine and ongoing accountability to the public.”).
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violating civil rights outweigh the costs.”241 The question,
then, becomes how to generate both public accountability
and,
perhaps
more
importantly,
constitutional
accountability. These questions are particularly pressing in
the context of public education, and arguably even more so
in the context of disciplinary alternative schools.242
1. Common Approaches to Generating Accountability.
Commentators have differed in their approaches to the
accountability problem, but tend to fall within one of three
camps: Trust the Government; Trust the Contract, which
may actually be a subset of Trust the Government; and
Trust the Market, perhaps itself a variant on Trust the
Contract.243 Unfortunately, none of these approaches
satisfies the need to hold both government and private
parties accountable at the back end of constitutional injury,
i.e., once a harm has already occurred. There is plenty both
governments and private party contractors could and should
do to prevent such injuries by creating accountability at the
front end, but the question this Article seeks to resolve is
how we can best ensure fair redress for those injuries and
accountability once they have taken place.
241. Frankel, supra note 11, at 1493 n.194. The electorate may believe, for
example, that children in alternative schools are simply “bad” kids, who deserve
to be treated harshly and to have more limited constitutional rights than other
students.
242. As one commentator has noted:
If a local school board decides to hire a private company to operate the
public schools under contract, questions arise concerning the ability of
the school board, and through the board, the public, to control the
operation of the schools. . . . Accountability can be reduced even if the
school board maintains ultimate control over the schools through the
choice of the contracting party, unless mechanisms are established to
maintain control over and scrutiny of the details of school operation.
Beermann, supra note 239, at 1525-26.
243. Others have suggested different breakdowns. See, e.g., Dolovich, supra
note 14, at 481 (suggesting categories of relying upon the courts, accreditation,
monitoring, and competition); Freeman, supra note 138, at 574-75 (suggesting
categories of those who wish to treat private parties as state actors, those who
wish to enforce nondelegation doctrine, those who would extend procedural
controls to private actors, and those who would infuse private law with public
law norms). With respect to these other paradigms, this Article is firmly in the
camp of preferring to treat private parties as state actors (taking for granted the
continued existence of delegation), i.e., looking to the courts for accountability.
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a. Trust the Government. A number of scholars
advocate reliance upon government itself to police private
contractors, prevent injury to the intended beneficiaries of
those contracts, and to redress injury once it has occurred.
Proposals for citizen watchdog commissions, government
administrative
oversight
and
monitoring,
and
administrative or agency review, all fall under this rubric.
As a general matter, others have noted the incentives many
government entities have “to excuse, ignore, or cover up
poor performance by the contractor” as “the contracting
agency is the institution with the most direct responsibility,
legally and politically, for the ultimate success or failure of
the contractor’s performance.”244 In addition, each of these
variations on trusting the government has its own flaws.
First, the idea of the watchdog commission, which
monitors and reports on the activities of private contractors,
perhaps by collecting data and relevant testimony, is an
appealing one, perhaps particularly for those interested in
promoting democratic values. Thus, Martha Minow
suggests a democratically oriented framework for public
accountability, one that relies upon the polity to police its
government: “The polity must ensure that governments, as
representatives of the public, retain the option to exit
relationships with private entities, the means to express
disagreements with the ways in which the private entities
proceed, and the capacity to remain with the private entity
as a vote of confidence.”245 She proposes these assurances
may be made perhaps via “a public commission, ideally
composed of representatives from both the public and
private sectors” that would “periodically review the
cumulative effects of privatization decisions. Alternatively,
a legislative or administrative body could hold hearings on
the effects of privatization and consider adopting guidelines
for government contracting or other privatization
measures.”246
Unfortunately, not only is it unlikely that the very
government entities engaged in privatizing behavior will
244. Aman, supra note 138, at 322.
245. Minow, supra note 12, at 1266 (citing ALBERT O. HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE,
LOYALTY: RESPONSES TO DECLINE IN FIRMS, ORGANIZATIONS, AND STATES
(1970)).
AND

246. Id. at 1269.
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establish a watch-dog commission, but Minow’s idealized
“polity,” as separate from “government” and to whom
“government” is beholden, also bears little resemblance to
most political communities in America today. It is no
coincidence that those services most likely to be privatized
are those serving the least powerful constituents.247 When it
comes to the privatization of disciplinary alternative
schools, we deal with a marginalized population within an
already voteless (and thus voiceless) group. Not only must
the government entity seeking to privatize these services be
held accountable, but so too must the public at large that
supports (expressly or tacitly) the privatization.
Second, others advocate government administrative
oversight of private contractors. For example, another
scholar argues in favor of “government supervision of
private decisionmaking,” contending that “government’s
regulatory and contractual powers, as well as its
administrative resources and expertise, put it in the best
position to control private delegates’ behavior.”248
This approach fails to take into account several
practical realities. Effective monitoring can be expensive
and time-consuming, and often requires expertise that state
agencies are unable or unwilling to provide.249 As one
commentator notes:
247. See, e.g., Metzger, supra note 15, at 1433 (“[G]overnment may be
particularly inclined to delegate without oversight when programs are
unpopular and participants lack the ability to defend their interests
politically.”).
248. Id. at 1471-72. Metzger correctly notes that current doctrine is deeply
imperfect, in that it creates incentives “for government to grant its private
partners broad discretion over government programs and minimize its
involvement in their actions.” Id. at 1375.
249. See, e.g., Frankel, supra note 11, at 1500 (“Effective monitoring,
particularly of complex, multifacted programs, is expensive, requiring
significant amounts of data as well as a well-trained workforce to evaluate it.”);
Dolovich, supra note 14, at 492 (“[In the private prison context,] [m]onitoring is
necessarily labor intensive and therefore expensive, requiring an investment
that states—which turned to privatization to save money—are not eager to
make.”). Dolovich further notes the danger of agency capture, relevant in the
private prison context, but also relevant here. Dolovich, supra note 14, at 49394; see also Guttman, supra note 11, at 909 (“[T]he continued and increased
reliance on third parties comes at the expense of official oversight capability
[because] higher pay and more interesting work . . . drive the best officials into
the contractor workforce.”).
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The assumption underlying this view [in favor of government
oversight] is that governments can adequately monitor the actions
of the private parties with whom they contract. . . . Additionally,
monitoring itself is fraught with difficulties. . . . [A] government
has to know what information it is looking for and how to find
it. . . . Consequently, monitoring often focuses instead on what
governments can measure: costs.250

State agencies with the resources and inclination to
provide such monitoring—and to exercise the control over
contracted entities necessary to make such monitoring
meaningful—are also arguably less likely to outsource in
the first place.
Finally, there are those who advocate some type of
agency review for those who claim to be injured by these
types of contracts. For example, Alfred Aman recommends
increased use of administrative law, via broader application
of the Administrative Procedures Act to certain private
actors, to generate accountability.251 Metzger proposes
“providing administrative complaint systems through which
individuals can obtain government review of private
decisionmaking.”252
This approach again relies upon government “to do the
right thing” by setting up administrative oversight
250. Frankel, supra note 11, at 1497, 1499. Frankel concludes that “the
current monitoring system, rather than providing a check against private
misconduct, may actually encourage it by rewarding those companies that
operate on the cheap and devote fewer resources to civil rights protection.” Id. at
1500.
251. Alfred C. Aman, Jr., Globalization, Democracy, and the Need for a New
Administrative Law, 49 UCLA L. REV. 1687, 1712-13 (2002). (“A twenty-first
century APA should apply to some private actors as well as the state,
particularly when private actors have significant power over the constituents
with whom they deal and they are engaged in public functions. . . . Contracts
used to outsource social services to the poor . . . should be viewed as rules,
subject to notice and comment . . . .”). The APA applies only to federal agencies,
but presumably this approach could be broadened to include its various state
analogues.
252. Metzger, supra note 15, at 1376; see also id. at 1374 (“[D]irect application
of constitutional limits to private actors is not necessary to achieve
constitutional accountability. . . . [T]he appropriate judicial response is not
subjecting private entities to direct constitutional scrutiny, but instead
requiring that the government create such mechanisms as the constitutionallyimposed price of delegating government power to private hands.”).
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procedures and structuring them fairly.253 It also results in a
curious laundering of the accountability process through
government. Metzger concludes that delegations absent
these “mechanisms that adequately substitute for direct
constitutional review” would be unconstitutional,254 but it is
unclear why we would not prefer just to have direct
constitutional review.255
State action doctrine is at its most meaningful when
government operates imperfectly, when private actors are
bad (or poorly trained) actors, when government colludes
with private actors, and when all does not function as it
should. The Congress that passed § 1983 recognized, quite
simply, that government cannot always be trusted.
b.
Trust
the
Contract.
Contractors
promote
accountability via the contracting process itself. This may
merely be a variant on Trust the Government, because the
proposals boil down to getting the government to contract
properly for services it wishes to outsource. The profit
motive will often act to incentivize private parties to resist
more stringent contracts, which leaves the promotion of
those contracts to a benevolent government entity to
pursue.
Pro-privatization advocates frequently point to the
importance of proper contract structuring to ensure quality
services are provided. The Reason Foundation, for example,
states:

253. A similar inclination to trust the state can be found in the caselaw as
well. For example, in Matwijko v. Board of Trustees of Global Concepts Charter
School, No. 04-CV-663A, 2006 WL 2466868 (W.D.N.Y. Aug. 24, 2006), the court
found the charter school in question to be a state actor because a statute defined
charter schools as “independent and autonomous public school[s] performing
essential, public purposes and governmental purposes of this state.” Id. at *5
(quoting N.Y. EDUC . LAW § 2853(c)-(d) (McKinney 2009) (internal quotation
marks omitted)). This approach functionally removes from the judiciary the
burden and right to determine state action and depends upon the good graces of
the state to identify each private party to whom it has delegated responsibilities
as a state actor.
254. Metzger, supra note 15, at 1374.
255. Another of Metzger’s proposals, that government simply limit the powers
it delegates, is similarly predicated on trusting the government to do the right
thing. See id. at 1477.
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The most important key to successful privatization is an effective
contract-monitoring system. School districts and other education
agencies should recognize that they are not getting out of the
business of education—they are merely shifting their role from
provider to contract monitor. Doing so means clearly defining the
evaluation criteria up front and sticking to those criteria. There
should also be a clear enumeration of the desired objectives and a
way to hold the [education management organization]
contractually accountable for achieving those objectives. 256

Freeman argues that “contracts themselves might do
more work as enforceable agreements” and suggests that
contracts “equip agencies with more effective enforcement
tools: Greater specificity of terms, graduated penalties, and
oversight . . . .”257 She further suggests that contracts could
explicitly confer third party beneficiary status to those who
receive the services in question258 and notes the benefits of
mandatory disclosure provisions in contracts.259
The question that remains unanswered by proponents
of accountability via contracting is: what incentive is there
for the contracting parties to structure their contracts in
this way? To the extent this is a cynical view, it is the same
perspective that has animated the development and growth
of § 1983 doctrine, which recognizes the real phenomenon of
government collusion with private actors to cause
constitutional injury.
In general, the private incentive for profit nearly always
counsels against more stringent contracting practices
because the protection of constitutional rights often costs
money, is inconvenient, inefficient, or all of the above.260
256. HENTSCHKE ET AL ., supra note 20, at 11; see also Metzger, supra note 15,
at 1479 (“A final alternative is [for governments] to design the delegation in
such a way that private entities’ exercise of their delegated authority
necessarily comports with substantive constitutional requirements.”).
257. Freeman, supra note 138, at 608.
258. Id.
259. Id. at 635.
260. In fact, in her critique of those who would proceduralize private
relationships, Freeman notes that forcing private actors to comply with
bureaucratic requirements, such as “following detailed procedures, providing
hearings, defending decisions to review boards and courts—could frustrate the
benefits of private participation in governance by imposing significant burdens.”
Id. at 587; cf. Guttman, supra note 11, at 863 (“[R]ules [created to govern these
arrangements may] reflect the interests of the third parties that call for them,
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Although the profit motive exists in almost any contracting
situation involving at least one private party, the particular
type of contracts at issue indicate a lower likelihood than
usual that mechanisms contained within the contract itself
will suffice for accountability.
First, these are service, as opposed to supply,
contracts.261 And, as Steven Schooner points out, “service
contracts, in addition to being difficult to write well, have a
tendency to require more contract management resources
than supply contracts.”262 Schooner notes that one way to
contract effectively in the service context is for the
government to use performance-based service contracting,
in which the contracting entity focuses on “performance
achieved rather than effort expended.”263 But this solution
but not necessarily the interest of the public at large. There is no assurance that
the larger public interest will be represented.”).
261. See Ruth Hoogland DeHoog & Lester M. Salamon, Purchase-of-Service
Contracting, in THE TOOLS OF GOVERNMENT: A GUIDE TO THE NEW GOVERNANCE,
319, 319-21 (Lester M. Salamon ed., 2002) (enumerating the defining features of
service contracting, including the populations typically served, nature of
services provided, difficulties encountered in evaluating performance, nature of
competition for such contracts, and incentives of contractors).
262. Steven L. Schooner, Competitive Sourcing Policy: More Sail than
Rudder?, 33 PUB. CONT. L.J. 263, 290 (2004); cf. Dolovich, supra note 14, at 478
(“[P]rivate prison contracts are necessarily ‘incomplete,’ meaning that the
contractor’s obligations cannot be fully specified in the contract itself.”).
Schooner also quotes the Office of Federal Procurement Policy, which states:
“Contracting for services is especially complex and demands close collaboration
between procurement personnel and the users of the service to ensure that
contractor performance meets contract requirements and performance
standards.” Policy Letter 93-1 ¶ 3, Office of Management and Budget (May 18,
1994). Schooner further distinguishes between personal services contracts, in
which the government “retains the function, but contractor employees staff the
effort” and nonpersonal services contracts, in which the government delegates a
task or function entirely to the contractor. Schooner, supra, at 290-91. The
staffing of a privatized disciplinary alternative school may take place in either
context.
263. Schooner, supra note 262, at 292 (emphasis omitted); see also id. at 294
(“The alternative to the performance-based approach is . . . [c]ontracts [that] do
not specifically describe tasks to be performed but instead merely state
manpower requirements. . . . That’s not the way to achieve the type of
objectives—increased quality, cost savings, efficiency, etc.—typically sought in a
principled outsourcing regime.”). In contrast, Guttman contends that:
The promise of “performance” or “incentive” contracting . . . may be of
least value where it is most needed—i.e., when, as with better weapons
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requires us to trust the government to structure its
contracts in a manner that, while more appropriate for the
task at hand, will likely also cost more money.
This leads to the second observation about these types
of contracts: they have to do with services for the
traditionally disenfranchised and voiceless, e.g., students in
need of disciplinary alternative educations, prisoners, and
children in foster care. The government incentive in these
situations to get the “problem” off its desk and the private
incentive to turn a profit may be particularly strong in these
situations.
In an ideal world, both government and private parties
behave themselves, whether by respecting constitutional
rights, structuring their contracts appropriately, and/or
seeking enforcement of those contracts. Perhaps contracts
would be drafted with explicit clauses providing third party
beneficiary protection.264 In an ideal world, there would be
no need for § 1983.
The question presented, however, is what happens
when things go wrong; when actors, whether government or
private, act in bad faith, or with deliberate indifference. Or,
when we deal with governments and private actors who
have simply neglected (whether because of indifference or
oversight) to structure their contracts in this way. Or, when
obeying the conventions of contract negotiation, private
parties insist upon an indemnification agreement with state
agencies to ensure protection against third party liability.
Section 1983 provides a powerful tool in addition to
injunctive relief: companies disinclined to risk their bottom
line at the front end by entering into service contracts with
onerous provisions may nevertheless be persuaded to

or better education, the products or services are not easy to define or
attain, and the definition of performance may itself change in midcontract with shifts in political or bureaucratic winds. Similarly, the
promise of accountability through the required evaluation of past
performance has proved illusory where past performance . . . is either
not readily measurable or is just not measured.
Guttman, supra note 11, at 909.
264. Absent such explicit drafting, third party beneficiary status is exceedingly
difficult to obtain. See infra Part IV.C.2.
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change their ways via damages actions that can impact
their profits at the back end.265
c. Trust the Market. A third group of scholars suggest
that we place our trust in the market economy. For
example, some suggest the use of private accreditation as a
means of creating accountability,266 the use of voluntary selfregulation,267 or the use of multiple service providers to
avoid monopolistic control.268
These suggestions have merit, but only where program
participants have a choice of whether to participate at all
and/or among institutions. When the targeted population is
vulnerable, the services essential (or, as here, legally
required), or the targeted population too limited to warrant
multiple service providers, the proposition that we rely
upon the market proves to be of limited value—and in many
privatization situations, there is little to no competition
whatsoever.269
In fact, what drives the outsourcing of some services—
such as education for troubled or special needs students—is
that local governments lack the resources to provide the
service and/or a sufficient client population. They then turn
265. See Frankel, supra note 11, at 1456-57 (“[P]rivate entities can be sued for
damages both when they contract with a municipality and when they contract
with a state, since private entities are not entitled to Eleventh Amendment
immunity.”).
266. Freeman, supra note 138, at 609.
267. Id. at 644.
268. Metzger, supra note 15, at 1376; see also id. at 1477 (“On some occasions,
acting on the government’s behalf does not give private delegates enhanced
power over others. One such situation is where there is a large pool of private
delegates who compete with one another and wield the same authority on the
government’s behalf, with the result that no delegate exercises monopoly or
even quasi-monopoly control . . . .”).
269. As Frankel notes:
[T]he argument that the risk of losing government contracts will keep
private entities in check assumes an efficiently functioning marketplace
in which governments can replace bad contractors with good ones.
Many of the markets for traditional public services, however, are
essentially oligopolies with few market participants. Private
contractors therefore face little risk that their employees’ constitutional
violations will result in revoked contracts or lost business.
Frankel, supra note 11, at 1501.
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to private providers, who serve as consolidators of the
market. The market, moreover, is largely a captive one,
with little to no choice; in many areas of the country, one
facility will have a functional monopoly on both the public
and private markets because there simply are not enough
students with such needs.270 As some have pointed out,
market competition may indeed result in the rescission of
contracts, but typically only where the noncompliance with
the contract terms is so egregious that there is a “public
outcry.”271
The other problem with accountability measures that
depend upon voluntary or private regulation is that the
consequences for violating such regulations often do little to
270. Other scholars have commented on the false presumption of market
competition in the prison health care context. Alfred Aman, for example,
suggests that there are few competitors for the government contracts on offer in
that context even though
the processes used are often based on the assumption that we are
replacing a government monopoly with an open market consisting of
many competitors, all vying for the government contract. This, in turn,
suggests that the competition for the contract will yield the most highly
efficient and skilled provider and, moreover, that these are not
competing goals.
Aman, supra note 138, at 303-04. He concludes that:
Government service contracts . . . represent a kind of regulatory
rulemaking, not just an agreement between a buyer and a seller. As
such, they should involve various stakeholders and members of the
community in addition to elected officials to assure that a
fundamentally politically process is not unduly narrowed to a simple
low- or least-cost contracting approach.
Id. at 303. This position returns us to a “Trust the Government” perspective.
Compare Richardson v. McKnight, 521 U.S. 399 (1997), in which Justice Scalia
notes:
[I]t is fanciful to speak of the consequences of “market” pressures in a
regime where public officials are the only purchaser, and other people’s
money the medium of payment. Ultimately, one prison-management
firm will be selected to replace another prison-management firm only if
a decision is made by some political official not to renew the contract.
This is a government decision, not a market choice. If state officers turn
out to be more strict in reviewing the cost and performance of privately
managed prisons than of publicly managed ones, it will only be because
they have chosen to be so.
Id. at 418-19 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
271. See, e.g., Dolovich, supra note 14, at 497.
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alleviate or address the underlying injury. That a private
actor who violates industry regulations may be kicked out of
the industry group and declared ineligible for future
contracts provides little comfort to an injured party.
Finally, even if market competition for these types of
educational services existed and worked, one questions
whether such services should be commoditized in the same
way as government contracts for roads and bridges.272 The
market, after all, is largely focused on extracting maximum
value for minimum cost, and encourages low-bid contracts.
It is unclear the extent to which denominations of value for
these types of services can be done accurately and
effectively; and, in the education context at least, the two
goals of value maximization and cost minimization may be
fundamentally incompatible.273
2. Section 1983 Accountability for State and Contractor:
Paying the Cost for Poor Contracting. In contrast to the
injury prevention only potentially offered by trusting in
government, contract, and/or the market, § 1983 liability
offers redress once injury has in fact occurred.
Both private party liability for actions committed by
private employees, and state party liability for actions
committed by its contractor, ensure that the full costs are
borne for shoddy contracting practices—whether as a result
of poorly drafted contracts or insufficient performance
monitoring. If the risk of § 1983 liability results in fewer
bids for such contracts, the service is perhaps ill-suited for
outsourcing in the first place.274
272. Cf. Aman, supra note 138, at 305 (“Effectively hidden from public view,
prisoner health is commoditized in a manner tantamount to roads, bridges, and
other natural things—and this should worry all of us.”).
273. See, e.g., Cheryl L. Wade, For-Profit Corporations That Perform Public
Functions: Politics, Profit, and Poverty, 51 RUTGERS L. REV. 323, 328 (1999)
(“Managers of the Education Companies must economize, sometimes at student
expense, in order to yield, at some point, greater profit for shareholders. . . .
Economizing to maximize profits, even when it compromises student interests,
may be required under corporate law.”).
274. See, e.g., Frankel, supra note 11, at 1504-05 (“If it is too expensive for a
private company to perform public functions in a way that adequately
safeguards federally protected rights, then perhaps those functions should be
left to the government to perform.”). Frankel’s position is that, assuming state
action, private entities found to be state actors should be subject to respondeat
superior liability. Id. at 1515.
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C. State Tort and Contract Relief as a (Non)Alternative
The fact that some injuries may be remedied via state
common law claims is irrelevant to whether plaintiffs may
also have federal constitutional claims.275 Furthermore, as
one commentator notes:
Putting aside whether constitutional rights have a special value
and deserve their own remedy that does not depend on state tort
law, many constitutional rights, including free speech, due
process, and reproductive choice, do not have state common law
analogues. Even if they did, the fact that state law, unlike § 1983,
does not provide for attorneys’ fees and in many cases has been
limited through various tort reform measures makes state law an
unrealistic option for many victims of constitutional injury. 276

However, many, if not most, plaintiffs in cases seeking
relief against privately-run disciplinary alternative schools
include a variety of tort claims in their pleas for relief.277
State law claims such as false imprisonment, intentional
infliction of emotional distress, and assault all dovetail
many of the injuries underlying the spectrum of potential
constitutional claims discussed in Part II. The question
Some commentators advocate a prohibition on such contracting at all,
where the state agency is arguably “outsourcing the very duties the agency was
created to undertake or fundamental responsibilities that flow from these
duties,” as opposed to “[c]ontracting for commercial services necessary to carry
out agency duties.” Aman, supra note 138, at 314. This Article does not take a
position on whether such contracting should be permissible, but rather
advocates that all parties to the contract bear the full costs for the contract via
subjection to § 1983 liability.
275. As Justices Harlan and Stewart note in their concurrence in Monroe v.
Pape, the legislative history of § 1983 indicates that Congress believed “a
deprivation of a constitutional right is significantly different from and more
serious than a violation of a state right and therefore deserves a different
remedy even though the same act may constitute both a state tort and the
deprivation of a constitutional right.” 365 U.S. 167, 196 (1961) (Harlan, J.,
concurring).
276. Frankel, supra note 11, at 1456.
277. See, e.g., S.G. v. Care Acad., Inc., No. 3:09-CV-422-S, 2010 WL 1416717,
at *1 (W.D. Ky. Mar. 31, 2010) (false imprisonment, intentional infliction of
emotional distress, assault); Robertson v. Red Rock Canyon Sch., LLC, No. 2:05CV-758 TC, 2006 WL 3041469, at *1 (D. Utah Oct. 24, 2006) (negligence,
intentional infliction of emotional distress, negligent infliction of emotional
distress, and fraud).
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remains whether the “private remedies and regimes” under
which these claims require plaintiffs to seek relief are
sufficient “to deal with the public aspects of the problems
involved.”278
1. Tort. To the extent that fully analogous claims do
exist in tort, it is worth noting that scholars have long
commented on the failures of tort properly to allocate
compensation, provide for any real deterrence of future
harm, and to allocate moral blame.279 These failures may be
further amplified where potential tortfeasors carry liability
insurance; insurance provides far less insulation where the
relief requested is an injunction governing future
behavior.280
Some have argued that the failings of tort are amplified
where those likely to be affected by a would-be tortfeasor’s
actions are “those who are less likely to claim or who will
recover lower damage awards—poor, unemployed, young,
old, or inadequately educated individuals, racial minorities,
noncitizens, and women.”281 A notable number of these
categories describe precisely the student (and corresponding
parent) population at disciplinary alternative schools.282

278. Aman, supra note 251, at 1702.
279. See, e.g., Richard L. Abel, A Critique of Torts, 37 UCLA L. REV. 785, 791
(1990) (“The purposes of tort law are to pass moral judgment on what has
happened, respond to the victim’s need for compensation, and encourage future
safety. It does a poor job of all three.”); see also Mark A. Geistfeld, Tort Law and
the Inherent Limitations of Monetary Exchange: Property Rules, Liability Rules,
and the Negligence Rule, 4 J. TORT L. 1, 10-11 (2011) (arguing that compensatory
damages fail to serve the public policy goal of injury prevention); Mark A.
Geistfeld, Punitive Damages, Retribution, and Due Process, 81 S. CAL. L. REV.
263, 274-75 (2008) (arguing that compensatory damages are unable to truly
make a plaintiff whole); Stephen D. Sugarman, Doing Away with Tort Law, 73
CALIF. L. REV. 555, 565-80 (1985) (arguing that tort fails to serve as a deterrent).
280. See Sugarman, supra note 279, at 573-80 (discussing impact of liability
insurance on deterrent effect of tort).
281. Abel, supra note 279, at 809.
282. Cf. Wade, supra note 273, at 346 (“Students of privatized schools are
vulnerable because the disparities in achievement between urban
schoolchildren, who attend the schools most likely to be privatized, and
suburban schoolchildren are stark. . . . [T]he parents of students in privatized
schools often lack the political power that is generally exercised by more
affluent citizens.”).
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Finally, a regime that provides solely for damages relief
has “distributional consequences” as well, whereby “[t]he
liberty of the judgment-proof would be enhanced. So would
the liberty of the very wealthy, assuming declining
marginal utility of each dollar and an incapacity to
introduce a principle of progressivity into the damage
award.”283
2. Contract. State contract law is also unlikely to be of
much use to would-be plaintiffs. Parents and students may
seek to sue under the predicate government contracts,
arguing that they are entitled to relief as third party
beneficiaries.284 Such claims face a variety of doctrinal
hurdles, however, and even where successful, provide only
limited relief.
First, parties seeking third party beneficiary status
must establish the existence of a valid and binding
contract,285 and, more importantly, establish that there was
an intent to benefit the third party.286 With regard to intent
in government contracts in particular, would-be plaintiffs
must demonstrate not only that the contractor intended to
benefit the third party, but also that the contractor intended
to confer a right to enforce the benefit on the third party. 287
Although it is not commonly done in today’s contracts for
disciplinary alternative schools, careful drafting by state
agencies and the private companies with which they
contract can easily foreclose third party beneficiary claims
simply by stating in the terms of the contract that the

283. FISS, supra note 231, at 76.
284. See 13 SAMUEL WILLISTON & RICHARD A. LORD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF
CONTRACTS § 37:1 (4th ed. 2000) (“[A] third party beneficiary contract arises
when a promisor engages to the promisee to render a performance to a third
person.”). If the third party is the intended beneficiary of the contract, it may
sue to enforce the duty to perform the contract. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRACTS § 304 (1981). A beneficiary is “intended” if the performance satisfies
an obligation of the promisee to pay money [debtor] or if “the promisee intends
to give the beneficiary the benefit of the promised performance.” Id. § 302.
285. WILLISTON & LORD, supra note 284, § 37:23.
286. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 302, 304 (1981).
287. Id. § 313.
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government agency is the sole intended beneficiary of the
contract.288
Second, even if plaintiffs prevail, they are bound by any
inadequacies of the contract itself because they are entitled
only to those rights contained in the contract.289 To the
extent the contract is vague or provides only for substandard protections or services to students, plaintiffs are
out of luck. Finally, the contract remedies themselves may
also be unsatisfactory, because such remedies are limited to
injunctive relief, specific performance of the contract, or
compensatory damages.290 Punitive damages are generally
unavailable for breach of contract.291
D. Transparency
There is also the curious question of whether
contracting entities running these types of schools would be
subject to Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”) requests
under state laws in the absence of a finding of state
action.292 If the schools are publicly funded, it is likely that a
substantial amount of information—e.g., student test
scores, budget information, and the contract with the
private entity—would be available via an information
288. Such terms may perhaps be challenged as being void for public policy. See
id. § 178 (“A promise or other term of an agreement is unenforceable on grounds
of public policy if legislation provides that it is unenforceable or the interest in
its enforcement is clearly outweighed in the circumstances by a public policy
against the enforcement of such terms.”). But that doctrine is difficult to recover
under as well. Not only is there a strong presumption favoring enforcement of
contracts, but parties seeking to invalidate a contract must demonstrate the
clear impropriety of the contract and that the impropriety outweighs the policy
favoring enforcement. See 5 SAMUEL WILLISTON & RICHARD A. LORD, A TREATISE
ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 12:3 (4th ed. 2009); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRACTS § 178 (1981). In addition, “the mere fact that a contract under some
circumstances may result in an act contrary to public policy will not invalidate
it when that consequence will not necessarily result from performance of the
contract, since it will be presumed that the parties will conform to the law.”
WILLISTON & LORD, supra, § 12:3.
289. WILLISTON & LORD, supra note 284, § 37:23.
290. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 357 (1981).
291. Id. § 355.
292. See generally Frankel, supra note 11, at 1495-97 for a discussion of state
freedom of information laws and the restrictions they may impose on requests
directed at private entities.
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request to the government agency that entered into the
contract.
However, one can also imagine a wealth of information
that might be unavailable (depending upon the structure of
the government contract) should the entity not be
considered a state actor, but which is nevertheless highly
relevant to the public interest293: employee information such
as teacher certifications, qualifications, and disciplinary
history; teaching materials and methodologies used
(sometimes considered proprietary by private education
companies); and school disciplinary policies and practices,
as well as data related to student discipline; staff training
materials, etc.294
At least one commentator has suggested that liberal
discovery rules may function as a serviceable substitute for
requests made under the state equivalents to FOIA.295
Setting aside whether discovery rules today are as liberal as
they once arguably were, the problem with this approach is
twofold: first, would-be litigants often rely upon publicly
available information gathered via FOIA and other methods
to ascertain whether they have a case and its scope, and to
draft a complaint; and second, in order to qualify for
discovery, would-be litigants must first survive a motion to
dismiss.
V. A WORKABLE DOCTRINAL TEST FOR STATE ACTION
The struggle at the center of this Article—who is liable
when the party who has committed an injury reports to, was
293. As one commentator notes (in the federal context), “[government
e]mployees, but not contractors, are covered by routine practices—such as the
publication of agency phone books and organization charts—that inform the
public of the name, title, and location of those who serve it. These practices do
not, with small exception, cover contractors (or their employees).” Guttman,
supra note 11, at 894.
294. One commentator argues that would-be contractors seeking to engage in
this type of work for a state entity “should agree that if they are chosen, they
will be subject to regular reporting requirements and a modified Freedom of
Information Act.” Aman, supra note 138, at 327. While such voluntary
cooperation during the contracting process would be nice, such an approach
requires us to trust the contract. See supra Part IV.B.1.b.
295. Jack M. Beermann, Administrative-Law-Like Obligations on Private[Ized]
Entities, 49 UCLA L. REV. 1717, 1723 (2002).
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hired by, or is otherwise an agent of someone else—arises in
doctrinal contexts other than state action, such as the
common law governing tort and agency. The specific
doctrinal tests that apply in these situations vary
somewhat, but all seek to determine when and under what
circumstances it is fair to hold one party responsible for an
injury committed by another.
In the state action context, as set forth in Part III
above, each of the various doctrinal tests seeks to ascertain
the extent to which the state may properly be held
accountable for injuries committed by a private party with
whom it has some type of relationship, or the extent to
which a private party can be treated as the state. Each test
focuses on the scope and quality of that relationship, and
the stronger it is, the more likely a finding a state action.
Unfortunately, as evidenced by the array of lower court
decisions in the aftermath of the Rendell-Baker decision,
existing state action doctrine is difficult to apply to
privately-run publicly-funded disciplinary alternative
schools. Rendell-Baker explicitly states that the provision of
alternative educational services is not a public function and
rejects the proposition that the state’s statutory obligation
to provide this type of education could indicate otherwise.296
This holding, coupled with San Antonio Independent School
District v. Rodriguez,297 which holds that there is no
fundamental right to education,298 would appear to foreclose
entirely a finding of state action under the public function
test.
As discussed above, the Court’s increasingly narrow
reading of the joint action test would appear similarly to
foreclose a finding of state action under that test, and state
compulsion is unlikely to present itself as an option in the
factual settings in which this Article is interested.299
296. Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 842-43 (1982); cf. id. at 849
(Marshall, J., dissenting) (arguing in favor of state action because the school
“provide[d] a service that the State [was] required to provide” under state
statute).
297. 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
298. Id. at 37.
299. A finding of state action pursuant to state compulsion is of course
possible, but cases in which there is evidence the state actually compelled
private actors to violate student constitutional rights are rare and do not
present a difficult doctrinal issue.
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Similarly, although a case could be made for entwinement
depending upon the particular factual circumstances of the
school, this Article is interested in schools in which such a
factual predicate does not exist. Not only would the RendellBaker school itself have seemed an appropriate candidate
for such approach, but even if that approach were viable,
private and public actors can easily restructure their
arrangements to avoid such entwinement.300
A. Doctrinal Tests Used in Other Areas of the Law
1. Agency and Tort Law. Agency and tort law focuses
largely on principal (or master, or employer) liability for
injuries committed by their agents (or servants, or
employees), in large part because the typical tort or agency
plaintiff prefers the deep pockets of the principal to the
often judgment-proof pockets of the agent.301 There are some
useful parallels in the agency and tort doctrine to the state
action inquiry, however, as both deal with the scope of
liability where one party answers to another, and some have
suggested that the respondeat superior doctrine counsels in
favor of state actor status for government contractors.302
In general, private companies under contract with the
government are more likely to be treated as independent
300. As Gillian Metzger notes:
[C]urrent doctrine applies [state action] protections when they are often
least needed—that is, when governments exercise close supervision and
thus constitutional norms can be enforced by targeting government
action directly. Worse still, focusing on government involvement creates
perverse incentives for governments to forego close oversight of their
private partners . . . .
Metzger, supra note 15, at 1371; see also id. at 1425 (“The inverse relationship
between the extent of government involvement and private authority means
that current doctrine has it nearly exactly backwards. Private actors given
broader discretion in their exercise of government power are less likely to be
subject to constitutional constraints than those who operate under close
government supervision and whose potential for abusive action is thus more
curtailed.”).
301. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
of respondeat superior).

OF

AGENCY § 219 (1958) (discussing doctrine

302. See, e.g., Kennedy, supra note 135, at 221-22. Kennedy contends that an
agency relationship and state action exists “[w]here government undertakes an
activity, funds it, authorizes a contractor to act on its behalf, and effectively
dictates the manner in which it is done . . . .” Id. at 222.
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contractors than government employees, and under
traditional agency and tort law, employers are not typically
liable for injuries committed by independent contractors
unless one of several exceptions applies.303 First, the
common law recognizes that employers may still be liable
for any role their own negligence plays in harms committed
by independent contractors. Employers who fail to exercise
reasonable care in the selection of a contractor, who fail to
ensure that such contractors take proper safety precautions,
and who fail to monitor or supervise their contractors face
liability even if they were not physically involved in
committing the underlying tort.304
Second, tort law acknowledges that some employer
duties are non-delegable. Non-delegable duties arise when
the duty performed is of enough significance to the
community that an employer cannot avoid liability by
delegating performance of that duty to another.305 Such
duties may arise from a contractual obligation, from statute,
or from common law.306
Third, tort law provides for employer liability for torts
committed by a contractor when the work performed is
inherently dangerous. This exception applies wherever a

303. In the context of these schools, private procurement of these contracts is
often explicitly premised on company expertise in educating students with
special needs that the contracting state agency does not have. Such independent
contractors may or may not be agents:
An independent contractor is a person who contracts with another to do
something for [the other] but who is not controlled by the other nor
subject to the other’s right to control with respect to [the] physical
conduct in the performance of the undertaking. He may or may not be
an agent.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 2(3) (1958).
304. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 410-12 (1965).
305. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 71,
at 512 (5th ed. 1984); see, e.g., Eli v. Murphy, 248 P.2d 756, 757-58 (Cal. 1952)
(common carrier duty to transport passengers safely); Brown v. George
Pepperdine Found., 143 P.2d 929, 930-31 (Cal. 1943) (duty of landlord to
maintain common areas, like elevators); Daly v. Bergstedt, 126 N.W.2d 242,
248-49 (Minn. 1964) (duty to keep premises safe for business visitors and
customers); Saari v. State, 119 N.Y.S.2d 507, 515 (Ct. Cl. 1953) (municipality’s
duty to keep streets in reasonably safe condition for travelers).
306. KEETON ET AL., supra note 305, §71, at 511.

688

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 60

clear danger is likely to arise in the normal course of the
performance of the contracted-for work.307
Each of these exceptions is relevant to the quandary
posed by harms committed by an independent contractor
hired by the state to operate a disciplinary alternative
school. The employer negligence exception is reflected at
least partially in existing state action doctrine, which
permits liability (for the contractor, as opposed to the
employer) where there is joint action.308 Where the doctrines
may diverge, however, is in the tort law recognition that
inaction
by
employers—apart
from
collusion,
encouragement, or participation in a joint enterprise—can
also result in liability.309
The concept of non-delegable duties is also relevant to
the inquiry when we consider the nature of the obligation
being outsourced in the alternative school context. Although
there is no federal constitutional right to a free public
education, many state constitutions contain such a right
and the duty of care owed by a state towards schoolchildren
once it decides to take on such an obligation may properly
be considered non-delegable.310 It is one thing for private
307. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 413, 416, 427 A (1965).
308. See supra notes 140-42 and accompanying text.
309. Cf. DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 20102 (1989) (“It may well be that, by voluntarily undertaking to protect Joshua
against a danger it concededly played no part in creating, the State acquired a
duty under state tort law to provide him with adequate protection against that
danger.”).
310. See ALASKA CONST. art. VII, § 1; ARIZ. CONST. art. XI, § 1; ARK. CONST. art.
XIV, § 1; CAL. CONST. art. IX, § 1; COLO. CONST. art. IX, § 2; CONN. CONST. art.
VIII, § 2; DEL. CONST. art. X, § 1; FLA. CONST. art. IX, § 1(a); GA. CONST. art.
VIII, § 1, para. 1; HAW. CONST. art. X, § 1; IDAHO CONST. art. IX, § 1; ILL. CONST.
art. X, § 1; IND. CONST. art. VIII, § 1; KAN. CONST., art. VI, § 1; KY. CONST. § 183;
LA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1; ME. CONST. art. VIII, pt. 1, § 1; MD. CONST. art. VIII, §
1; MASS. CONST. pt. 2, ch. V, § 2; MICH. CONST. art. VIII, § 2; MINN. CONST. art.
XIII, § 1; MISS. CONST. art. VIII, § 201; MO. CONST. art. IX, § 1(a); MONT. CONST.
art. X, § 1, cl. 3; NEB. CONST. art. VII, § 1; NEV. CONST. art. XI, § 2; N.H. CONST.
pt. 2, art. 83; N.J. CONST. art. VIII, § 4, para. 1; N.M. CONST. art. XII, § 1; N.Y.
CONST. art. XI, § 1; N.C. CONST. art. IX, § 2; OHIO CONST. art. VI, § 3; OKLA.
CONST. art. XIII, § 1; OR. CONST. art. VIII, § 3; PA. CONST. art. III, § 14; R.I.
CONST. art. XII, § 1; S.C. CONST. art. XI, § 3; S.D. CONST. art. VIII, § 1; TENN.
CONST. art. XI, § 12; WASH. CONST. art. IX, § 2; W. VA. CONST. art. XII, § 1; WIS.
CONST. art. X, § 3; WYO. CONST. art. VII, § 1; see also Denise A. Hartman,
Constitutional Responsibility to Provide a System of Free Public Schools: How
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schools to operate wholly independent of the state, but
another when the state seeks to delegate its de facto and de
jure obligations. Tort law properly acknowledges this
distinction, by recognizing the difference between an
accident that takes place when a homeowner decides to
repair her roof herself, and where she hires an independent
contractor.
The public safety and protection principles underlying
the inherently dangerous activities exception are also
arguably relevant. Although the operation of disciplinary
alternative schools does not pose any inherent safety
dangers to bystanders or passersby, the equivalent
population of concern under tort law would be the students
attending such schools. And this Article contends that the
disciplinary nature of these schools and the targeted
student population combine to create an inherent danger of
constitutional injury.311
Finally, tort law recognizes that those who are required
by law or who voluntarily take custody of others in such a
way as to deprive them of their normal ability to protect
themselves are obligated to protect them from foreseeable
harms.312 This obligation includes a duty to exercise
reasonable care to control the conduct of third persons.313
Notably, the rule is traditionally applied to sheriffs or peace
officers, jailers or wardens of penal institutions, officials in
charge of a state asylum, and to teachers or other persons in
charge of a public school.314

Relevant Is the States’ Experience to Shaping Governmental Obligations in
Emerging Democracies?, 33 SYRACUSE J. INT’L L. & COM. 95, 98-100 (2005). In all
states, moreover, school attendance is compulsory. 2 DONALD T. KRAMER, LEGAL
RIGHTS OF CHILDREN § 24:4 (2d ed. 2005 & Supp. 2010).
311. See supra Part II.
312. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 314 A (1965).
313. Id. § 320.
314. Id. cmt. a; see also, e.g., Doe Parents No. 1 v. State, Dep’t of Educ., 58
P.3d 545, 593-94 (Haw. 2002) (finding the State Department of Education liable
for its negligent retention and supervision of an employee who sexually
molested students at an elementary school); Hansen v. Bath & Tennis Marina
Corp., 900 N.Y.S.2d 365, 367 (App. Div. 2010) (finding that because a school’s
physical custody over students deprives the students the protection of their
parents, the school may be held liable for foreseeable injuries).
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2. Section 1983. The concept of state action is
inextricably bound with § 1983 doctrine, which authorizes
action only where the alleged injury was committed “under
color of state law.”315 The Court’s § 1983 jurisprudence is
illuminating, particularly when we focus on several key
aspects of that doctrine.
First, § 1983 doctrine consistently recognizes state actor
liability even where (or particularly where) the party acts in
violation of the law. Officers of the state act “under color of”
the law for 1983 purposes even if they were not commanded
by the state to undertake the action in question, and even if
that action is actively prohibited by the state, as long as the
action was “rendered possible or . . . efficiently aided by the
statutory authority lodged in the wrongdoer.”316
Second, § 1983 doctrine distinguishes between those
situations in which the state has placed someone in an
institution involuntarily and those in which attendance is
voluntary. Thus, states have an affirmative duty of care to
provide medical services to incarcerated prisoners because
they have deprived them of the liberty to procure such
services themselves,317 to protect prisoners from violence
inflicted by other inmates,318 and to provide involuntarily
committed mental patients with the services necessary to
ensure their safety.319 In contrast, the state is not
constitutionally obligated to provide employees (who
voluntarily accept offers of employment) with any minimum
levels of safety or security.320
Third, in the context of municipal liability—relevant
here because the state entities most likely to contract with
private companies to provide educational services are local
315. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006). As the Supreme Court has often noted, the state
action and under-color-of-state-law requirements are identical. See, e.g., United
States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787, 794 n.7 (1966) (“In cases under § 1983, ‘under
color’ of law has consistently been treated as the same thing as the ‘state action’
required under the Fourteenth Amendment.”).
316. Home Tel. & Tel. Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 227 U.S. 278, 287 (1913); see
also discussion infra Part V.B.1.
317. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103 (1976).
318. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 833 (1994) (citing Cortes-Quinones v.
Jiminez-Nettleship, 842 F.2d 556, 558 (1st Cir. 1988)).
319. Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 324 (1982).
320. Collins v. City of Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 127-28 (1992).
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and county entities, i.e., municipalities for the purposes of
§ 1983—the Court has held that plaintiffs must
demonstrate that the alleged harm was the result of official
custom or policy, and not merely the result of an employeremployee relationship.321 The Court has also held that a
failure to train employees may suffice for municipal liability
where “the failure to train amounts to deliberate
indifference to the rights of persons with whom the
[officials] come in contact.”322
Taken together, these aspects of § 1983 doctrine
indicate a strong cause of action for students who were
involuntarily referred to a school and who can show a
pattern of injuries caused by school employees who were
improperly or inadequately trained.
B. A Proposed Test for State Action
Whereas other commentators have focused upon
critiques of the state action requirement, or upon altering
current doctrine to address cases they believe have been
wrongly decided, this Article seeks to work within existing
doctrine, highlighting what the Court has already found
significant to point the way toward an appropriate
analysis.323 It concludes that a two-pronged approach is
appropriate for identifying at least a subset of state actions:
(1) was the injury caused by someone cloaked in the
authority of the state, and (2) was the injury made possible
only because the state placed the complainant in the
injuror’s care? In order to find state action, the answer to
both questions must be affirmative; but affirmative answers
are sufficient, not necessary, for a finding of state action.
1. Was the Injury Caused by Someone Cloaked in the
Authority of the State? The first question to ask in the
context of injuries committed by publicly-funded privatelyrun school employees or officials, is whether those
321. Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978).
322. City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388 (1989).
323. See, e.g., Daphne Barak-Erez, A State Action Doctrine for an Age of
Privatization, 45 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1169, 1192 (1995) (“[A] seemingly ‘private’
activity should be considered as a state action if . . . it is public in nature
(according to present understanding of the responsibilities of the state); and . . .
the state refrains from operating an equivalent service . . . .”); Krotoszynski,
supra note 146 (arguing in favor of state action meta-analysis).
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individuals were cloaked in the authority of the state when
they committed the injuries. In other words, were those
individuals capable of inflicting the harms alleged solely by
virtue of the power granted them by the state, or were the
harms more akin to private harms, like common law tort
injuries?
Both state action and § 1983 doctrine are explicitly
premised in recognition of the unique powers conveyed by
state authority. The Court has insisted that relief only be
granted where it is the state that has acted, and not a
private party—even where the private party’s action is
arguably possible only because of state inaction, and even
where only the state actor is sued.324 These doctrines
recognize that once an individual has been vested with state
authority, that authority carries “a far greater capacity for
harm than an individual trespasser exercising no authority
other than his own.”325 Even misuse of that power is
considered state action (or action taken under color of state
law) because that power was possessed by virtue of state
law and made possible only because the wrongdoer is
clothed with the authority of state law326: “[P]ower, once
granted, does not disappear like a magic gift when it is
wrongfully used.”327
324. DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 197-200
(1989); see also id. at 196 (“[The Due Process Clause’s] purpose was to protect
the people from the State, not to ensure that the State protected them from each
other.”).
325. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403
U.S. 388, 392 (1971). Moreover, as some have noted:
[a]s a symbolic matter, the imprimatur of the state might matter to us.
Discrimination at the hands of a government agency might sting more
than discrimination at the hand of our neighbor. More concretely, the
particular coercive power of the state—to impose financial penalties,
withhold benefits, condemn our property, throw us in jail—is
undeniable.
Freeman, supra note 138, at 551.
326. United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 326 (1941).
327. Bivens, 403 U.S. at 392; see also Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 9293, 111 (1945) (upholding conviction under federal civil rights statute of police
officers who beat a black man to death because the murder was committed while
the officers were cloaked with the authority of the state); Home Tel. & Tel. Co. v.
City of Los Angeles, 227 U.S. 278, 287 (1913) (“[W]here an officer or other
representative of a State in the exercise of the authority with which he is
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Thus, the police officer who punches a person in her
custody is liable under § 1983, whereas one passerby who
punches another is liable only for assault. The differing
treatment for the same underlying physical actions reflects
several understandings: first, that the officer may not have
been in a position to inflict the injury but for her official
position (it is easier to escape from your neighbor’s headlock
than an officer’s handcuffs); second, that that difference
may be reflected in the nature and seriousness of the
injuries inflicted; and finally, that injuries inflicted by the
state are qualitatively different from those inflicted by
private parties (perhaps in part because you are more
outraged by the malfeasance of those whom your tax dollars
support). Whether the officer acted within the proper scope
of her official authority is irrelevant for purposes of § 1983
liability.328
The question then becomes whether a search of a
student’s physical body without reasonable suspicion looks
like an illegal search conducted by a police officer (or other
officer of the state), or like a private individual patting
down a kid from the neighborhood; whether the infliction of
school discipline without notice and opportunity to be heard
looks more like a state deprivation of liberty without due
process, or a private individual confining a child without his
parent’s permission; and whether religious indoctrination at
a school looks more like a state establishment of religion, or
like private proselytizing.
This Article contends that in each of these instances,
the injuries inflicted are cloaked in state authority. Just as
prisoners in custody find it difficult, if not impossible, to flee
or otherwise avoid injury inflicted by prison guards,
students at disciplinary alternative schools cannot avoid
injuries inflicted by school officials and employees in the
same way that they can run from the neighborhood bully.
Flight is not only more difficult but may also be
accompanied by additional injury or officially sanctioned
punishment.

clothed misuses the power possessed to do a wrong forbidden by the
[Fourteenth] Amendment, inquiry concerning whether the State has authorized
the wrong is irrelevant . . . .”).
328. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 171-72 (1961).
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The law provides police officers with the authority to
conduct searches, recognizes the possibility that they will
misuse that power, and further acknowledges that misuse of
that power is categorically different from the use of private
power. The average citizen does not feel free to decline a
search by a police officer but would feel free to walk away
from a stranger who asks to see inside their bag.
School officials and employees are in a position to
search and discipline students solely by virtue of the
authority granted to them by the state. And that authority
further empowers them to punish students who refuse to
comply with their directives. Misuse of this authority thus
results in injuries that are qualitatively different from
privately inflicted harms. Because these injuries could not
have been inflicted but for the cloak of state authority, their
infliction should be considered state action.
2. Was the Injury Made Possible Only Because the State
Placed the Complainant in the Injuror’s Care? The general
rule that a state actor is not liable for inaction that results
in harms inflicted by private actors appears initially to
doom claims of state actor liability for failure to monitor
properly the activities of a contractor. However, an
exception to this rule exists where the state has confined a
person and so made him unable to protect himself against
the harms inflicted by a private actor.329
The second prong of the proposed test draws upon the
“special custodial relationship” doctrine that creates an
exception to the general rule that the state has no
affirmative duty to protect its citizens from private harm.330
Under this doctrine, the state assumes such a duty when it
takes physical custody of people or otherwise prevents them
from helping themselves.331 The duty arises from “the
State’s affirmative act of restraining the individual’s
freedom to act on his own behalf—through incarceration,
institutionalization, or other similar restraint of personal
liberty.”332 Thus, “[t]he affirmative duty to protect arises not
329. See supra Part V.A.2.
330. Cf. DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 202
(1989) (finding in that case that state had no duty to protect plaintiff from his
father’s violence).
331. See id. at 200.
332. Id.
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from the State’s knowledge of the individual’s predicament
or from its expressions of intent to help him, but from the
limitation which it has imposed on his freedom to act on his
own behalf.”333 Unlike the situation in DeShaney, moreover,
where the injuries were caused by a wholly private party,
the injuries alleged by students at disciplinary alternative
schools are caused by actors who would not have been in the
position of authority to inflict the injury but for the
intervention of the state (via referral to the school).334
There is, of course, no federal constitutional right to a
free public education.335 And, as the Court underscored in
Rendell-Baker, the provision of education is not a function
traditionally reserved exclusively to the states.336 However,
in the context of disciplinary alternative schools, the fact of
involuntary referral should be critical. Although RendellBaker and other cases make clear that education has never
been exclusively a public function, involuntary referral of
students coupled with compulsory education laws makes
their education at these schools functionally an exclusive
function, i.e., they have no choice but to attend.337 This
understanding is reflected in the lower court cases, and
rightly so. In the alternative school context, the fact of
involuntary referral to the schools in question, coupled with
compulsory education, creates the equivalent of a nondelegable duty of care.
333. Id.
334. Cf. id. at 201 n.9 (“Had the State by the affirmative exercise of its power
removed [plaintiff] from free society and placed him in a foster home operated
by its agents, we might have a situation sufficiently analogous to incarceration
or institutionalization to give rise to an affirmative duty to protect.”).
335. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 35 (1973).
336. Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 842 (1982).
337. The forcible referral of students to disciplinary alternative schools may
perhaps be analogized to the forcible removal of children from homes in the
foster care context, which has been recognized as an exclusive prerogative of the
state and thus an indicator of state action. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 219, § 8.9,
at 505 (“The principle that appears to be emerging from the lower court
decisions . . . is that the government has an affirmative duty to protect children
in foster care when the government placed them there. But the government has
no such obligation to provide protection when the children are voluntarily put in
foster care without active government involvement.”); see also Coupet, supra
note 187, at 116 (“[T]he state, and only the State, may involuntarily remove
children from the custody of their parents, exercise legal and physical custody
over them, and deliver them legally into the hands of private agents.”).
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3. The Critical Combination of Involuntary Referral
with Actions Cloaked in the Authority of the State. This
Article contends that when the state (1) places an individual
in an institution that is privately run and publicly funded
(or where her care, at least is publicly funded), and (2)
thereby subjects her to the authority of the parties running
the institution, actions taken by those parties become
cloaked in the authority of the state, regardless of whether
the parties are private.
The source of state authority for the placement is
irrelevant: sometimes the state acts as legal guardian, as is
the case with placement of children in orphanages or foster
care facilities; sometimes as an agent of the people
empowered to inflict punishment, as is the case with
referrals to prisons; and sometimes merely via exercise of
its powers as the state, as is the case with referrals to
alternative disciplinary schools. What matters is that
persons placed in these institutions would not be there but
for the intervention of the state.
The extent to which the placement is truly involuntary
may vary somewhat, but this Article contends that a
referral becomes doctrinally relevant when the individual is
threatened with consequences from the state—as opposed to
private parties—if she attempts to leave the institution in
question. Criminal consequences, as for those breaking out
of prison, are the clearest example. But in the context of
disciplinary alternative schools, students may be charged
with truancy or expelled from the state’s school system if
they fail to attend as directed. Students who are referred by
the juvenile justice system may also face additional
consequences if their attendance at a particular school was
a judicially imposed condition.
The combination of state placement and state
consequences for failure to comply creates the state
imprimatur on the actions taken by the institution
necessary for state action. It creates the “approval or
enforcement” by the state that is demanded by the Court.338
This analysis is consistent with the Court’s jurisprudence to
date, even though it is not reflected explicitly in the
canonical statements of state action doctrine.

338. Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1010 (1982).
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Thus, in West v. Atkins—in which the Court found state
action in the context of publicly-funded but privatelyprovided care, in the form of a private doctor under contract
with a public prison339—both prongs of the proposed test are
met: admission to the institution in question was strictly
involuntary and at the hands of the state, and the actions of
the doctor were cloaked in the authority of the state because
the prisoner had no other choice of medical care provider.
In Blum v. Yaretsky,340 another case involving a
publicly-funded privately-run institution, the Court declined
to find state action in the decisions of private nursing homes
to transfer publicly-funded Medicaid patients to lower levels
of care.341 Neither prong of the proposed doctrinal test was
met. First, attendance at the institution in question was
voluntary: residence in a nursing home, much less a
particular nursing home, is not state-mandated, and no one
is subject to punishment for attempting to leave such a
home.342 Second, the actions of the nursing homes were not
cloaked in the authority of the state.343 The plaintiffs in
Blum alleged not that the decisions to shift patients from
one level of care to another were imbued in any way with
the authority of the state, but rather that the state
responded to those concededly private decisions by reducing
their Medicaid benefits.344
Although the Court’s line of cases dealing with state
action in the context of attachment and garnishment does
not involve a publicly-funded privately-run institution, per
se, it does deal with private parties seeking to exercise the
power of the state. In these cases, the Court has drawn a
strong line between those actions cloaked in the authority of
339. 487 U.S. 42 (1988); see also discussion supra Part III.B.2.
340. 457 U.S. 991 (1982).
341. Id. at 998.
342. Id. at 1011.
343. Id. at 1003 (“This case is obviously different from those cases in which the
defendant is a private party and the question is whether his conduct has
sufficiently received the imprimatur of the State so as to make it ‘state’
action . . . .”).
344. Id. at 1010 (“Adjustments in benefits levels in response to a decision to
discharge or transfer a patient does not constitute approval or enforcement of
that decision. . . . [T]his degree of involvement is too slim a basis on which to
predicate a finding of state action in the decision itself.”).
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the state (and thus “involuntary” in the sense that noncompliance would be accompanied by adverse state
consequences) and those undertaken by private parties.
Thus, in Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp.,345 state action
was found because officers of the state had acted jointly
with the creditor to secure the property in dispute,346 but in
Flagg Brothers v. Brooks,347 there was no state action where
the creditor moved independently to sell the property
pursuant to a self-help provision of a state statute.348 More
recently, in Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co.,349 the Court noted
that joint action is found when a private party “invok[es]
the aid of state officials to take advantage of state-created
attachment procedures.”350
Finally, the Court’s relatively recent decision in
Brentwood illustrates the proposed doctrinal test’s
inapplicability to institutions that are not both publiclyfunded and privately-run. In Brentwood, the Court found
the institution in question—the Tennessee Secondary
School Athletic Association—to be a state actor, even
though membership in the institution was strictly
voluntary.351 Voluntariness of admission, however, is
irrelevant where the institution itself is both publiclyfunded and publicly-run.352 The inquiry in Brentwood thus
turns properly upon the public nature of the institution
itself rather than voluntariness of admission or nature of
the authority exercised over members.
CONCLUSION
Plaintiffs seeking to challenge constitutional rights
violations by private actors in publicly funded school
settings can and should request relief under § 1983 against
345. 395 U.S. 337 (1969).
346. Id. at 338-39.
347. 436 U.S. 149 (1978).
348. Id. at 151-53.
349. 457 U.S. 922 (1982).
350. Id. at 942.
351. Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 531 U.S. 288,
291 (2001).
352. Id. at 298. The Court emphasized that 84% of the Association’s voting
membership consisted of public schools. Id. at 291.
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such actors if the following circumstances are met: (1)
students are involuntarily referred by the state (via, e.g., a
local or state education agency or the state juvenile justice
system); (2) the actions complained of are not peripheral to
the government contract with the entity operating the
school; and (3) the actions complained of are committed by
employees cloaked in the authority of the state.
Although the Court’s state action doctrine often appears
opaque, the goal of this Article has been to look at it
through the lens of one particular type of publicly-funded
privately-run institution in the hopes of shedding light on
how the doctrine might properly be understood as applied to
other similar institutions. The proposed test is both
consistent with the Court’s jurisprudence and applicable to
other traditionally government funded but privately-run
institutions at which attendance or participation is
compulsory and the population served a vulnerable one,
such as foster care facilities.353
The test is not without its quirks. It applies only to
publicly-funded
privately-run
institutions,
and
its
application may result in a finding of state action for the
purposes of one individual (who was involuntarily referred)
but not for another (who attended voluntarily). It is
nevertheless grounded in existing state action doctrine,
other related areas of the law, and provides substantive
guidance to those seeking to define the joint action and
nexus tests.
Finally, the test also places proper emphasis on the
critical role of state action, and by extension § 1983 liability,
in generating constitutional accountability in our
democratic system. Litigated solutions are often imperfect,
but in the absence of a more perfect world in which
government agencies and the private parties with whom
they contract may be trusted to act with the public’s
interests at heart, they are often the best we have.
353. New federal regulations passed in 1996 permit the privatization of these
services. The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act
of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105 (relevant portion codified at 42
U.S.C. § 672(c) (2006)). This has resulted in the widespread use of state and
federal dollars to fund the care of parentless children at for-profit institutions.
Susan Vivian Mangold, Protection, Privatization, and Profit in the Foster Care
System, 60 OHIO ST. L.J. 1295, 1296 (1999); Nina Bernstein, Deletion of Word in
Welfare Bill Opens Foster Care to Big Business, N.Y. TIMES, May 4, 1997, at 1.

